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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1982, a Liberian oil tanker in international waters was
attacked by Argentine fighter aircraft on combat patrol during the Fal-
klands War. The damage was extensive and the vessel was eventually
scuttled in the South Atlantic. The vessel's owner and its time-charter
subsequently brought a civil action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York against the Republic of Argen-
tina.' The district court dismissed the claims and held that the Repub-
lic of Argentina was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in a two to one decision, reversed the district court and held
that the Alien Tort Statute' vested the trial court with federal jurisdic-
tion over the Republic of Argentina." The Alien Tort Statute was
viewed as granting the federal court jurisdiction over any civil action
by an alien for a tort committed in violation of international law.5 Re-
lying on the evolving standards of international law, the Second Circuit
ruled that an attack on a neutral vessel in international waters violated
"settled" principles of international law so as to state a prima facie
case under the Alien Tort Statute and foreclose any claim of sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'
l. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. Id. at 74-77 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982)). Section 1604 states as
follows:
Subject to international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections
1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.").
4. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988). See Court Rules that Argentina Can Be
Sued in Attack on Tanker, N.Y. Times, Sept..13, 1987, at A1S, col. 1 (discussing
decision of the Second Circuit); N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at A22, col. 1 (reporting
that the Supreme Court had agreed to grant certiorari to review the decision of the
Second Circuit and to decide "whether Argentina may be sued in the United States for
its military attack on a neutral oil tanker engaged in United States domestic trade").
5. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425.
6. Id.
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The decision in Amerada Hess dramatically expands federal juris-
diction over foreign governments. However, the tenet underlying this
exercise of virtually unlimited jurisdiction is seriously flawed for several
reasons. First, the ruling that the actions of the Republic of Argentina
were illegal and subject to the jurisdiction of and civil liability in a
United States federal court is an arbitrary interference by the judiciary
with the fluidity and flexibility of United States foreign policy. By de-
claring that an act of the Argentinean armed forces was in violation of
international law, the Second Circuit has recklessly impinged upon the
constitutional parameters of the executive to structure the tenor of
American diplomatic relations. Second, the decision fundamentally en-
croaches upon the sovereign discretion of the Republic of Argentina to
pursue its national security interests. Third, the purported basis for the
decision, that Argentina violated customary principles of international
law, disregards the pervasive lack of consensus afforded the right to
innocent passage of neutral shipping in a time of war. Fourth, by uni-
laterally expanding the reach of federal jurisdiction, the decision seri-
ously contradicts the legislative intent to set forth the exclusive stan-
dards for asserting jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns within the
parameters of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Thus, the deci-
sion encroaches upon the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
the federal courts in matters affecting the diplomatic relations of the
United States.
For these aforementioned reasons, a fundamental recalibration is
needed to address whether: (1) the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in fact sets forth the exclusive standards for asserting jurisdiction over
foreign governments; (2) the act of state doctrine remains a viable prin-
ciple in American jurisprudence or is an anemic tenet; (3) the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act sets forth an exclusive jurisdictional grant;
and (4) there is any limitation, either legal, territorial or political, gov-
erning federal jurisdiction over foreign governments. Absent review by
the Supreme Court affirming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as
the exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, the
present uncertainty will most likely generate legislative reversal of the
Second Circuit's decision.'
7. For examples of situations in which the legislature has acted to modify a judi-
cial opinion, see, e.g., Senate to Thwart Court, Approves A Bill Extending Anti-Bias
Laws, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at AI, col. 3. (reversing by statute the effects of a
1984 Supreme Court decision limiting civil rights enforcement); Maryland Senate,
Without Debate, Defeats Two Gun Control Measures, Wash. Post, March 25, 1988, at
Cl, col. 3. (Maryland Senate nullifies 1985 decision by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, Kelly v. R.G. Industries, 304 Md. 120, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) holding makers
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II. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN UNITED STATES COURTS
A. Traditional Principles
The extent to which a court is authorized to entertain suits against
foreign governments has traditionally depended upon the principle of
foreign sovereign immunity. Foreign sovereign immunity is a custom-
ary principle of international law under which a court is to respect the
integrity of a foreign government by abstaining from exercising juris-
diction over the foreign state.' United States jurisdiction over foreign
governments has not been divorced from this immunity doctrine. Up
until the early 1950's, the United States followed the doctrine of abso-
lute sovereign immunity which barred claims against foreign govern-
ments without exception. 9 This absolute immunity was applied irrespec-
tive of the nature of the conduct underlying the action."0
Initially, the responsibility for determining whether a foreign gov-
ernment was amenable to suit or entitled to sovereign immunity rested
with the State Department through formal advisory recommendations
to the judiciary. In light of the prevailing theory of absolute immunity,
this analysis was merely perfunctory. However, depending upon the
particular diplomatic alliance of the sovereign defendant, the State De-
partment in some cases recommended that the foreign government was
not immune from suit." Recommendations, whatever the slant, were
dispositive of the issue and were deferred to by the courts without ex-
ception. 2 With the post World War II emergence of the global econ-
omy, based on international commercial transactions, and the expan-
and sellers of small handguns can be held liable for injuries with those weapons).
8. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). Accord Lete-
lier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 670 (D.D.C. 1980). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1487' 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6004, 6005-06 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. ("Sovereign immu-
nity is a doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in appropriate
cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state. It differs from diplomatic immunity
(which is drawn into issue when an individual diplomat is sued).").
9. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-88 (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-590,
(1943)); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 33-36 (1945).
10. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)). Although the Supreme Court in The Schooner Ex-
change held that the courts of the United States lacked jurisdiction over a naval vessel
of a foreign state found in a United States port, that decision came to be regarded as
extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., Berizzi Brothers
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V MARSA EL
HARIGA, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1168-69 (D. Md. 1978).
11. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-88.
12. Id.
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sion of United States political, economic, and military commitments
throughout the world, the scope of sovereign immunity evolved away
from the traditional concept of absolute immunity. In the early 1950's,
the State Department formally adopted the "restrictive theory" of for-
eign sovereign immunity."3 Under this theory, immunity was accorded
for the foreign sovereign's public acts but was denied for a foreign
state's commercial activity. " The practical aim of the restrictive theory
was to veer away from the practice of absolute immunity and move
towards an assumption of jurisdiction over foreign governments partici-
pating in commercial transactions.' 5 The incorporation of the restric-
tive theory did not alter the procedural mechanism of the dispositive
State Department immunity determinations."6
13. Id. The State Department adopted the "restrictive" theory of foreign sover-
eign immunity in the "Tate Letter". The pertinent provisions are quoted extensively in
Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980).
14. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; see Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La
Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Under this approach [restrictive theory]
immunity was 'restricted' to suits involving public, governmental acts, while no immu-
nity was provided for claims involving the commercial or private acts of a foreign state
.... "). Under the restrictive theory, only actions involving sensitive governmental af-
fairs were considered public and required the court to abstain from exercising its juris-
diction. These public acts primarily were limited to the following categories: (1) inter-
nal administrative acts; (2) legislative acts; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4)
acts relating to diplomatic activity, and (5) public loans. Unless it was clear that the
particular activity came within one of these exceptions, the State Department would
not recommend that the foreign government was immune from suit. Amerada Hess,
638 F.Supp. at 74.
15. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74.
16. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1985). The adoption of the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity was also intended to conform United States foreign sovereign prac-
tices with the prevailing international standards. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
8, at 6607-08 which stated:
In the mid-1950's, when the United States first became involved in foreign suits on
a large scale, foreign counsel retained by the Department of Justice were in-
structed to plead sovereign immunity in almost every instance. However, the exec-
utive branch learned that almost every country in Western Europe followed the
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity and the Government's pleas of immu-
nity were routinely denied in tort and contract cases where the necessary contacts
with the forum were present. Thus, in the 1960's, it became the practice of the
Department of Justice to avoid claiming immunity when the United States was
sued in countries that had adopted the restrictive principle of immunity, but to
invoke immunity in those remaining countries that still held to the absolute immu-
nity doctrine. Beginning in the early 1970's, it became the consistent practice of
the Department of Justice not to plead sovereign immunity abroad in instances
where, under the Tate letter standards, the Department would not recognize a
19881
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Under the post-1950 scheme, however, the application of sovereign
immunity frequently led to results which were inconsistent with the re-
strictive theory of immunity.17 Diplomatic pressure directed at the
State Department often succeeded in influencing its counsel to the
court. Considerations of realpolitik, therefore, continued to lead to rec-
ommendations of immunity in cases where abstention was not sup-
ported by the prevailing theory of immunity. 18 Thus, from at least
1950, sovereign immunity determinations were subject to a variety of
political realisms.1 9 These political considerations led to a pervasive ab-
sence of consistency and clarity in the application of sovereign immu-
nity and the determination of the amenability of foreign governments
to suit in the United States courts.
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
1. Purpose
The lack of uniformity in the application of the restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity compelled Congress to enact the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976 ("FSIA" or "Act")." The FSIA
was intended to set forth the exclusive standards governing the amena-
bility of foreign governments to the jurisdiction of the United States
courts.2 This legislation was primarily aimed at (1) extinguishing the
inconsistency which had plagued prior recommendations of immunity;
(2) bringing a concentrated and consistent structure to future determi-
nations of foreign sovereign immunity; and (3) reducing the political
foreign state's immunity in this country ....
17. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,
670 (D.D.C. 1980).
18. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74.
19. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488-89.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982).
21. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.8
(D.D.C. 1985); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 6610-11 which sets forth in
pertinent part:
This bill, entitled the "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976," sets forth the
sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immu-
nity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States.
It is intended to preempt any other State or Federal law (excluding applicable
international agreements) for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their po-
litical subdivisions, their agencies, and their instrumentalities. It is also designed to
bring U.S. practice into conformity with that of most other nations by leaving
sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to the courts, thereby discontinuing the
practice of judicial deference to "suggestions of immunity" from the executive
branch.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
and diplomatic implications of foreign sovereign immunity determina-
tions.2 The Act codified the restrictive theory and, thereby, formally
reconciled the standards governing sovereign immunity in United
States courts with the prevailing international standards.2" Moreover,
in order to ensure that routine actions against foreign governments for
claims arising out of their commercial activity would not take on undue
political significance,24 Congress abolished the courts' dependence on
advisory recommendations by the State Department and placed the re-
sponsibility for making immunity determinations solely within the
22. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1985); Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 670.
23. See Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp 246, 251; Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) which
notes:
The legislative history states that the Act "incorporates standards recognized
under international law,' and the drafters seem to have intended rather generally
to bring American sovereign immunity practice into line with that of other na-
tions. At this point, there can be little doubt that international law follows the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. House Report at 6613. See, e.g., State
Immunity Act, 1978, s. 3 (United Kingdom); Council of Europe, European con-
vention on State Immunity, art. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1976 Hearings at 37, 38;
Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. 56 (1963) (West Germany).
See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 6605-06 stating.
The bill, . . . would accomplish four objectives.... First, the bill would codify the
so-called "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized in
international law. Under this principle, the immunity of a foreign state is "re-
stricted" to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not
extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis). Second, the
bill would insure that this restrictive principle of immunity is applied in litigation
before U.S. courts. At present, this is not always the case. Today, when a foreign
state wishes to assert immunity, it will often request the Department of State to
make a formal suggestion of immunity to the court. Although the State Depart-
ment espouses the restrictive principle of immunity, the foreign state may attempt
to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the State Department's determination.
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immu-
nity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign
policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these
often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process .... Third, this bill would for the first time in U.S. law,
provide a statutory procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam
jurisdiction over, a foreign state.
24. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254 n.8; see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 6611 ("Section 1330 provides a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme in cases
involving foreign states. Such broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be condu-
cive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate treatment of cases
involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations consequences.").
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judiciary.25
2. Comprehensive Provisions
The Act is unambiguous and sets forth the comprehensive stan-
dards governing the amenability of foreign governments to suit in both
federal and state courts. Jurisdictional issues involving foreign govern-
ment defendants were intended to be determined exclusively pursuant
to the comprehensive provisions set forth within the FSIA. The provi-
sions of the Act were expressly stated to be the "sole and exclusive"
standards to be used in asserting actions against foreign governments
and resolving questions of sovereign immunity. That interest is re-
flected in the structure of the Act: "[A] foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."2 If
none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the FSIA
applies, the foreign government is not subject to the jurisdiction of a
United States court.28 In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,2"
the Supreme Court affirmed the comprehensive nature of the FSIA as
governing the amenability of foreign sovereigns to suit in the United
States. In holding that the Act governed suits against foreign govern-
ments brought by aliens, the Court reasoned that the legislative history
25. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; Frolova, 761 F.2d at 372; Von Dardel, 623 F.
Supp. at 253. As an additional note, the exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA must
also comport with the due process requirement of minimum contacts. Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 308; Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Came, 705 F.2d 250, 252
(7th Cir. 1983); Waukesha Engine Div. v. Banco National De Fomento, 485 F. Supp.
490, 492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (It is plain from the legislative history of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act that due process notions of minimum contacts have been
incorporated in the Act); see also Imodume Corp. v. Ardinas Argentinas, 640 F. Supp.
354, 360 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Exercise of personal jurisdiction over Argentinean airline
under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act required airline's minimum contacts with Vir-
ginia and could not be based on contacts of airline with nation as a whole."); contra
Kalamazoo Spice Ext. Co. v. Provisional Military, 616 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Mich.
1985) ("In determining whether foreign state has sufficient minimum contacts with
forum state for forum state to exercise personal jurisdiction, relevant question is
whether foreign state has sufficient contacts with United States as a whole, rather than
any particular state, so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.").
26. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489-90; Alberti, 705 F.2d at 250; MacArthur Area
Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987); LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 8, at 6610-11.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
28. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 485 n.5.
29. Id. at 480.
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revealed a clear intent not to restrict the class of potential plaintiffs to
actions brought solely by United States citizens. 0
3. Exceptions to Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign is presumptively immune
from all actions that may be asserted against it by either a United
States citizen or an alien., 1 This presumption is subject to a set of spe-
cific exceptions detailed in sections 1605 and 1607.32 If the claim as-
serted against a foreign sovereign is encompassed within one of these
exceptions, a court may exercise jurisdiction. However, if the action
does not fall within one of the exceptions, the court is jurisdictionally
incompetent to preside over the claim against the foreign state.
33
The FSIA was intended to provide jurisdiction over a foreign gov-
ernment's commercial conduct and over a limited number and type of
tort actions committed within the United States. A foreign sovereign is
generally immune from suit for any action taken in its governmental
capacity.34 Specifically, the exceptions set forth within the Act include
cases in which- (1) a foreign state has waived its immunity;3 5 (2) the
30. Id. at 490-91.
31. The Supreme Court in Verlinden explained that:
The House Report recites that the Act would provide jurisdiction for "any claim
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under sections
1605-1607,". . . and also states that its purpose was "to provide when and how
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities,".... At
another point, however, the Report refers to the growing number of disputes be-
tween "American citizens" and foreign states, . . . and expresses the desire to
ensure "our citizens ... access to the courts," .... As the language of the statute
reveals, Congress protected against this danger not by restricting the class of po-
tential plaintiffs, but rather by enacting substantive provisions requiring some form
of substantial contact with the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). If an
action satisfies the substantive standards of the Act, it may be brought in federal
court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff .... (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).
Id. at 490-91. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372; Al-
berti v. Empresa Nicarguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1983); Mac-
Arthur, 809 F.2d at 919.
32. MacArthur, 809 F.2d at 919; Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 250.
33. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 485 n.5; Frolova, 761 F.2d at 372; Alberti, 705 F.2d at
256.
34. See, e.g., Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 307
(2d Cir. 1981). (if the activity is not "commercial" but rather is "governmental" for-
eign state is entitled to immunity under § 1605 and "original jurisdiction" is not pre-
sent under § 1330(a)).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, 558 F. Supp. 358, 363 n.3 (N.D. 111. 1983), affid, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1988]
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action is based upon either a foreign sovereign's commercial activity
carried on in the United States or commercial activity having a connec-
tion with the United States;-" (3) the action is one in which rights in
property are taken in violation of international law;37 (4) the action
involves rights in real estate and other property located in the United
States; 8 (5) the action is for certain noncommercial torts within the
United States; 9 (6) the action involves certain maritime liens;4 0 and
(7) the action involves certain counterclaims."- The FSIA contains no
general exception to immunity based on violations of international law
outside of the context when property is taken in violation of interna-
tional law.
III. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In addition to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, an action
asserted against a foreign government must withstand the scrutiny of
the act of state doctrine. This doctrine is a common law abstention
principle which declares that a court will not adjudicate a politically
sensitive dispute involving a determination of the validity or legality of
1985)(rejecting concept of implicit waiver); but see Siderman v. Republic of Argen-
tina, No. Civ. 82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal. March 12, 1984)(sovereign may implicitly
waive its immunity for human rights violations). Accord Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at
256.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). The commercial activity exception is the most
widely cited exception to foreign sovereign immunity. The commercial activities excep-
tion states in substance that a foreign state is immune from the suit when the action is
based upon (1) a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or (2) an act performed itt the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States. See Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v.
Turbomeca S.A., 677 F. Supp. 1096, 1098-1101 (D. Colo. 1988).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1982).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982). Subsection (a)(5) denies immunity to claims
for damages sought against a foreign government for personal injury or property dam-
age occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 379 (recognizing explicit
legislative intent to deny immunity only where injury or damage occurs in the United
States). 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) was originally directed at the problem of traffic acci-
dents involving diplomats. However, the section was drafted to encompass a broader
class of tort actions. Cf. MacArthur, 809 F.2d at 921.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1982).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1982).
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an act of a foreign government. 2 The traditional American formula-
tion of the doctrine has been stated as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another one within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves.4"
Although not a strict jurisdictional hurdle, the act of state doctrine
does require a court to abstain from deciding issues affecting certain
public acts of foreign governments notwithstanding a statutory grant of
jurisdiction." It precludes a court from inquiring into the merits or
legality of the conduct of a foreign sovereign acting in its public capac-
ity."' Furthermore, this abstention is based upon a reluctance to review
certain non-commercial judgments and, thus, avoid inquiry by a foreign
court into the policies of the United States.46 As a consequence, a
42. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 452; Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 n.7 (1976) (quoting
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)); see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, (1918) cited in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309
(1918); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1548-49 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Repub-
lic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d, 1473, 1481 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987). In Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the United States Supreme Court
held that the act of state precluded the adjudication of the validity of certain expropri-
ations of the Cuban government. Id. at 415-37. The Supreme Court based its decision,
in part, on the absence of any international consensus as to whether a government's
expropriation of private property without just compensation constituted a violation of
international law. Id. at 415. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia recognized that the acts of a foreign government often flow beyond any
geographical limitation and extended the act of state doctrine to a terrorist attack al-
legedly undertaken by Libya in Israel. See, e.g., P.L.O. Accuses Israel in Killing of
Senior Military Figure in Tunis, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
43. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 300-303 (D. Cal. 1986) (act of
state doctrine provides a basis for dismissal only if the case cannot be resolved without
passing on the validity of the relevant act of state).
44. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 452.
45. Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 672 F. Supp 7 (D.D.C. 1996),
afl'd, 834 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (act of state doctrine precluded court from inquir-
ing into validity of Czechoslovakia's nationalization of textile plants).
46. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 452; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); see International Ass'n of Machinists,
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United States court is advised to abstain from adjudicating issues
which question the legitimacy and legality of the conduct or policy of a
foreign government.4
7
The act of state doctrine essentially acknowledges the reality that
certain claims involving foreign affairs are not within the competency
of the judiciary."8 As a result, the doctrine is particularly designed to
preempt judicial review of questions touching on foreign affairs."9 This
abstention primarily stems from a recognition that the adjudication of
the value and validity of foreign policy judgments will obstruct rather
than advance United States diplomatic interests.5 0 This reluctance, ad-
ditionally, is the product of a resolve to defer issues involving foreign
policy questions to the discretion of the Executive. 1 Consequently, al-
649 F.2d at 1359 (abstention is warranted regardless of whether the foreign govern-
ment is named as party to the suit or whether the validity of its actions are directly
challenged in the pleadings).
47. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The act of state doctrine is analogous to the discretionary function exception. Under
this exception, the government is liable only for its "operational" decisions, not its
"planning" decisions. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). The pur-
pose of the discretionary function exception is to permit government executives "to
make policy decisions in an atmosphere free of concern over possible litigation." Id. at
479-80; Olsen by Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir.
1984); see also MacArthur, 809 F.2d at 922 (explaining that the discretionary function
exception intended to preserve immunity for decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy).
48. See International Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1358-59; Liu, 642 F.
Supp. at 300-301.
49. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803 (Bork, J., concurring). Accord Allied Bank Int'l v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520-21 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
473 U.S. 934 (1985); see International Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1360 (The
"touchstone" or "crucial element" is the potential for interference with our foreign
relations); Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 452 (the district court must engage in the
broader analysis of the possible adverse effects upon foreign relations to make a prelim-
inary assessment of the impact on international relations that would result from judi-
cial consideration of the sovereign's act).
50. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
51. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 802 (Bork, J., concurring). See also Drexel Burham
Lambert Group Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). The court
stated:
The act of state doctrine was originally grounded in principles of sovereign immu-
nity .... In its modern incarnation, however, the doctrine focuses on the balance
of power between the three branches of our own government, and in particular the
danger that the judiciary might interfere with the dominant role of the executive
branch in the conduct of foreign affairs .... The doctrine does not take the form
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though the Constitution does not expressly impose the act of state doc-
trine, the underlying rationale has been recognized as involving "consti-
tutional underpinnings."52 The concern for preserving the balance of
power in the foreign affairs arena arises from the practical recognition
of the adverse inconsistency which may result from the competition of
ideas in resolving foreign policy issues5s and a desire to preserve a sin-
gle voice in the conduct of foreign affairs."' Therefore, the scope of
judicial inquiry in cases involving the conduct of foreign policy must be
limited in order to respect the dignity of an independent foreign state
as well as to preserve the basic relationship between branches of gov-
ernment in conducting foreign policy.
IV. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") was originally enacted as part of
the First Judiciary Act of 1789. During this period, the United States
was in its nascent stage of development and plagued with the desire to
promote its commercial relationships by maintaining diplomatic har-
mony. 5 The ATS purports to grant the federal district courts "original
of an absolute or inflexible rule, but rather requires a careful case-by-case analysis
to determine if, in a particular situation, the conduct of foreign affairs by the
executive branch is likely to be vexed or hindered by judicial review of the acts of
a foreign government.
52. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); First
National Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Foreign relations:
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations
are political. E.g., "The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is commit-
ted by the Constitution to the executive and legislative - 'the political' -departments of
the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Also:
Not only does [the] resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the executive or legislature; but many such
questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. Yet
it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of
its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling
in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible conse-
quences of judicial action."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962)(footnote included).
53. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
54. Id. at 427-28.
55. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782, 784 (Edwards, J., concurring); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d
at 812, 814-815 (Bork, J., concurring). This orientation was clearly expressed in a per-
tinent discussion contained within George Washington's final manuscript of his Fare-
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jurisdiction" over any tort action by an alien if committed: (1) in viola-
tion of international law, or (2) in violation of a United States treaty."
Sensitive to the international ramifications of denying ambassadors re-
dress, Congress intended the statute to open United States courts to
suits by foreign ambassadors claiming violations of their diplomatic im-
munity.57 The statute does not require that the alleged tort be commit-
ted within the United States. Because the Alien Tort Statute was en-
acted during a period in which foreign sovereigns generally enjoyed
absolute immunity, the ATS was intended to set forth a jurisdictional
grant over individuals and not sovereigns. Consequently, the ATS was
not intended to conflict with principles of sovereign immunity.
Two interpretations of what violations of international law are
contemplated by the Alien Tort Statute have emerged from the federal
circuits. A broader view of the jurisdictional grant of the ATS has been
set forth by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.5 In Filar-
tiga, a former Paraguayan police official residing in the United States
faced a civil suit brought by Paraguayan citizens for the death of a
young man allegedly tortured to death in Paraguay in retaliation for
the young man's father's anti-government protests. 59 The defendant
was not permitted to invoke the defense of diplomatic immunity. The
Second Circuit sustained jurisdiction over the defendant under the
well Address dated September 19, 1796. Washington noted:
The Great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations is in extending
our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possi-
ble.-So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled, with
perfect good faith.-Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which
to us have none, or a very remote relation.-Hence she must be engaged in fre-
quent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our con-
cerns.-Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artifi-
cial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations
and collisions of her friendships, or enmities:--Our detached and distant situation
invites and enables us to pursue a different course.-If we remain one People,
under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy mate-
rial injury from external annoyance ....
F. GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POL-
iCY 145-46 (1961).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 820-21 (Bork, J.,
concurring); Guinto v. Marco, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
57. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 815 (Bork, J., concurring). See also Von Dardel, 623 F.
Supp. at 254 (In 1789, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the district courts of the
United States to suits by aliens claiming tortious violations of diplomatic immunity").
58. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 878.
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ATS.60 The appellate court emphasized that an action brought pursu-
ant to the ATS must sufficiently assert a uniformly accepted violation
of international law.61 Interpreting international law as a developing
body of principles, 2 the court found that the "official torture" of an
individual constituted a "clear and unambiguous" violation of interna-
tional law. 63
Most recently, the Filartiga decision was explained in Forti v.
Suarez-Mason.6" In Forti, a civil action was brought in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California by Argen-
tinean citizens against a former Argentinean general responsible for the
Buenos Aires province. The action arose out of Argentina's "dirty war"
against dissident citizens and claimed damages from the defendant
general for conduct including torture, murder, arbitrary detention, dis-
appearance and degrading treatment, all allegedly committed in Ar-
gentina by various military and police personnel under the defendant's
command. The court held that "official torture," "murder" and "arbi-
trary detention" constituted cognizable violations of international law."
The court emphasized that the prohibition against these acts was
"clear," "unambiguous," "universal," "obligatory," and "definable." 6
As a result, the court found that there was a sufficiently recognized
foundation to allege a violation of international law and assert jurisdic-
tion under the ATS over the former Argentinean military officer. 7
60. Id. at 889.
61. Id. at 880.
62. Id. at 881 ("Thus it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as
it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.");
Accord Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
64. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Aliens May Sue for Torts Abroad, Nat.
Law J. Nov. 2, 1987, at 3, col. 1. See also Ex-Argentine General Loses U.S. Extradi-
tion Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A7 col. I (discussing extradition of the de-
fendant and status of civil suits).
65. Forti, 672 F.Supp. at 1539.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court noted:
[T]he proper interpretation of the statute [ATS] has been discussed at some
length in the principal decisions upon which the parties rely. . . the unanimous
decision in Filartiga ... and the three concurring opinions in Tel-Oren .... The
Court is persuaded, however, that the interpretation of § 1350 forwarded by the
Second Circuit in Filartiga .... and largely adopted by Judge Edwards in Tel-
Oren, is better reasoned and more consistent with principles of international law.
There appears to be a growing consensus that 1350 provides a cause of action for
certain "international common law torts." [A] plaintiff seeking to predicate juris-
diction on the Alien Tort Statute need only plead a "tort... in violation of the law
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However, the court dismissed the claims for "disappearance" and "de-
grading treatment" based on a lack of consensus that those claims vio-
lated accepted principles of international law."8
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the
application of the ATS and detailed a more narrow view of what viola-
tions of international law were contemplated by the statute's jurisdic-
tional grant. In Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,69 the court consid-
ered whether jurisdiction over Libya and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization could be properly maintained for claims brought by Is-
raeli citizens arising from a terrorist attack in Israel. The plaintiffs,
survivors of the attack and representatives of some of those killed, as-
serted jurisdiction primarily pursuant to the ATS. The court of appeals
dismissed the action but issued three distinct concurring opinions.
Judge Edwards adopted the Filartiga analysis but, based upon factual
distinctions, held that no sufficient international consensus existed to
warrant an extension of Filartiga to support federal jurisdiction over
the tort of terrorism.7 0 Judge Bork adopted a more narrow reading of
the statute and reasoned that the doctrine of separation of powers lim-
ited the jurisdiction of the ATS to those violations of international law
that were recognized as actionable in 1789.71 Judge Bork indicated that
the purpose of the statute, to avoid diplomatic contention, would only
be sustained by limiting the jurisdictional grant to those tortious ac-
tions contemplated in 1789.72 Judge Robb cited separation of powers
concerns similar to those expressed by Judge Bork and cautioned
against judicial interference in politically sensitive areas, such as inter-
national terrorism, where the principle of international law is vague
of nations.".. .The contours of this requirement have been delineated by the Fi-
lartiga court and by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren. Plaintiffs must plead a violation
of the law of nations as it has evolved and exists in its contemporary form....
This "international tort" must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather than
hortatory), and universally condemned.... The requirement of international con-
sensus is of paramount importance, for it is that consensus which evinces the will-
ingness of nations to be bound by the particular legal principle, and so can justify
the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the international tort claim....
68. Id. at 1543.
69. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
70. Id. at 791-96 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards outlined the actions
fitting within the international law definition of the ATS as follows: (1) genocide, (2)
slavery or slave trade, (3) the murder; (4) torture; (5) arbitrary detention; (6) system-
atic racial discrimination; and (7) any consistent pattern of recognized human rights
violation. Id. at 781.
71. Id. at 813-14 (Bork, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 815-16.
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and not adequately defined."'
The decisions in Tel-Oren and Filartiga reveal an absence of con-
sensus as to what constitutes a "violation of international law" for the
purposes of asserting jurisdiction under the ATS. Although the two de-
cisions are distinguishable, there remains a common principle which
squarely registers. To sustain jurisdiction under the ATS, an alien must
assert a tort which is recognized as a uniformly accepted violation of
international law. The distinction between Filartiga and Tel-Oren is
whether this recognition is limited to those torts accepted in 1789 or
may be based on more modern assumptions.
Jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS appears to be limited to personal
injury and wrongful death actions, not property damage claims.74 Fur-
thermore, pure jurisdiction under the ATS has only been sustained
against individual defendants; namely, former government officials, not
foreign sovereigns. Reliance on the decision in Von Dardel v.
U.S.S.R. 5 to support the assertion that the ATS confers jurisdiction
over a foreign state for a violation of international law is misplaced. In
Von Dardel, the court sustained jurisdiction under the ATS and en-
tered a default judgment against the Soviet Union in an action brought
against it for various torts committed against a Swedish diplomat be-
lieved to have been imprisoned and killed by the Soviet Union after
World War 11.71 Although jurisdiction was upheld against the foreign
state, the district court based its decision more on a violation of diplo-
matic immunity, one of the torts recognized in 1789, than on a contem-
porary violation of international law.7 7 Consequently, Von Dardel tends
to buttress the opinion of Judge Bork in Tel-Oren rather than to ex-
pand the reasoning in Filartiga to support a jurisdictional grant encom-
passing a property damage claim against a foreign government.
V. Amnerada Hess Shipping Corporation v. Argentine Republic
A. Facts
United Carriers, Inc. ("United Carriers"), a Liberian corporation,
was the owner of a 220,117 deadweight ton oil tanker of Liberian Reg-
73. Id. at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397
(5th Cir. 1985) ("the standards incorporated into the law of nations encompass only
such basic human rights; the taking by a state of its national's property does not con-
travene the international law of minimum rights").
75. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 262-63.
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istry named HERCULES.7 8 On April 26, 1977, Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corporation ("Hess"), a Liberian Corporation, time-chartered the
vessel for the purpose of transporting crude oil from Valdez, Alaska to
a Hess oil refinery in the Virgin Islands.78 The vessel's width precluded
passage through the locks of the Panama Canal. As a result, the HER-
CULES sailed between Alaska and the Virgin Islands by travelling
around South America, past the Falkland Islands and through the
South Atlantic."
In April of 1982, the Falkland Islands literally became the battle-
ground of a seventy-four day war between the Republic of Argentina
and Great Britain involving intensive sea and air combat operations."1
On May 2, 1982, the HMS CONQUEROR, a British submarine, sank
the Argentine cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO.82 On May 5, while
voyaging from Valdez to St. Croix, the HERCULES became involved
in the Falklands War. At the request of the Argentine Navy, the vessel
was diverted off her course, in order to search for survivors of the
GENERAL BELGRANO. The HERCULES was released and later
completed her voyage to St. Croix.88
78. Joint Brief for Appellants at 2, Amerada Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603).
79. A time-charter is a contract by which the owner leases a vessel to a "char-
terer" for a specific time or use. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1330 (5th ed. 1976);
see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, §§ 4-14 through 4-19, at
229-39 (1957).
80. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 73. The Falkland Islands are located approxi-
mately 300 miles off of the eastern coast of Argentina in the South Atlantic.
81. For an excellent discussion of the conflict, see Freedman, The War of the
Falkland Islands, 1982, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 196 (1982).
82. Mayday in the South Atlantic, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1981, at 19. The
magazine reported the incident as follows:
On May 2nd a British hunter-killer nuclear-powered submarine, believed to be
HMS CONQUEROR, torpedoed Argentina's second largest ship, the GENERAL
BELGRANO, a creaking 43-year-old 13,645-ton cruiser. The ship tried to limp
home, but foundered in a storm after its crew had taken to the lifeboats. Some 750
of the 800-1,000 men thought to be on board were reported to have been rescued
by Thursday. Two days later, the Argentines had their revenge: a French-made
Exocet missile, fired from a Super Etendard naval fighter-bomber, skimmed across
maybe 20 miles of water to hit the 4,100-ton destroyer HMS SHEFFIELD. The
missile struck the control room, starting a fire that could not be put out. Most of
the crew of 270 were lifted off but at least 30 men were thought to have died ....
Both the GENERAL BELGRANO, which was just outside Britain's 200-mile no-
go area around the Falklands, and the SHEFFIELD, whose position at the time of
being struck is a British military secret shared by Argentina, appear to have been
on the fringes of their respective fleets.
83. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74.
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On May 25, 1982, the HERCULES began its return voyage to
Alaska. On June 2, Argentine aircraft attacked the British-flag com-
mercial tanker WYE. As a response to this attack and in an effort to
protect neutral shipping in the area, the United States Maritime Ad-
ministration sent telexes to Argentina and Great Britain listing United
States flag vessels and United States interest shipping that would be
transiting the war zone." By June 8, 1982, the HERCULES was in
international waters approximately 600 nautical miles off the Argentin-
ean coast and outside the declared blockage zone.85 That afternoon, the
HERCULES was attacked in three different strikes by Argentine Air
Force fighter aircraft. 86 The vessel's deck and hull suffered extensive
damage. A bomb penetrated the vessel's superstructure and remained
undetonated at the bottom of the ship's No. 2 tank." Partially dis-
abled, the vessel was diverted to the port of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
After an investigation by the Brazilian Navy, the vessel was ordered to
leave the port. 8 The owner, realizing that it would be unreasonably
dangerous to attempt to remove the bomb and repair the HERCULES,
scuttled the tanker on July 20, 1982, in the South Atlantic. 9
United Carriers claimed a loss of $10,000,000 on the sunken vessel
and the loss of the charter hire. Hess claimed damages in the amount
of $1,901,259.07 as a result of the loss of the bunkers (fuel) which
84. Id.
85. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423; see Invasion, THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 1982,
at 18 ("Britain has sharply stepped up the pressure on Argentina by declaring a com-
plete blockade of the Falklands from April 30th. The 200-mile exclusion zone around
the islands previously applied only to Argentine naval ships; from Friday all ships and
aircraft from any country, commercial or military, became "liable to be attacked" by
British forces .... ). See also Mayday in the South Atlantic supra note 82, at 19 ("On
April 30th, the Argentines . . . declared their own 200-miles exclusion zones off their
coast and around the Falklands.").
86. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. Argentine military aircraft strafed, rocketed
and bombed the vessel in three separate attacks on June 8, 1982: at 1350 Greenwich
Mean Time ("G.M.T."), when she was located, 46 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude;
at 1430 G.M.T. when she was at 45 degrees 16 minutes South latitude, 48 degrees 25
minutes West longitude; and at 1625 G.M.T. when she was at 46 degrees 55 minutes
West longitude. The British had requisitioned and dispatched numerous merchant ves-
sels, such as container ships and commercial tankers, to support its action against the
Argentineans. See Will Two Weeks' Steaming Let Off the Pressure, THE ECONOMIST,
May 8, 1981, at 19. The Argentinean pilots may have mistaken the vessel for a British
support vessel. In fact, one of the British commercial container ships was sunk by Ar-
gentinean forces. See The Battle of San Carlos, THE ECONOMIST, May 29, 1982, at 19.
87. Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 7.
88. Brief for Appellee at 3, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603).
89. Amerada Hess, 630 F. Supp. at 74.
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went down with HERCULES.9" After an unsuccessful attempt to seek
recourse in Argentina,91 the owner and charterer brought a consoli-
dated action in federal district court in New York.
B. The Opinion of the District Court
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected any expansion of federal jurisdiction over a foreign sov-
ereign beyond the FSIA. The district court held that "[a] foreign state
is subject to jurisdiction in the courts only if an FSIA exception em-
powers the court to hear the case."9 The court ruled that unless a
foreign sovereign waives immunity, asserting a tort claim against a for-
eign government requires that the damage or loss occur within the
United States. 93 The district court held that because there was no
waiver of immunity and the losses claimed occurred outside the United
States, the action fell beyond the purview of the FSIA. As a result, the
court summarily dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.94
The court further held that to interpret the ATS as vesting a court
with jurisdiction over foreign governments -where the FSIA forbids it
would make a "nullity" of foreign sovereign immunity in United States
courts.9 5 The court, although crediting Hess' assertion that the Alien
Tort Statute provided a basis for jurisdiction as being "innovative," re-
jected that contention." Relying on a static interpretation of the ATS,
the court found that Argentina would have been immune from suit in
1789. Moreover, the court recognized that although the FSIA did not
tacitly repeal the ATS, it repealed any grant of jurisdiction for actions
brought against foreign governments. 97
90. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. The Hercules was returning to Alaska "in
ballast" or without cargo. The loss to Hess would have been substantially larger if the
vessel had been attacked on its fully loaded voyage from Alaska to the Virgin Islands.
91. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74.
92. Id. at 75.
93. Id. at 76. The court dismissed any contention that this tort action fell within
the purview 1605(a)(5) because the damage and loss of property occurred outside the
United States.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 77 (citing In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, Misc.
No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1985)).
96. Id.
97. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 76. Hess also argued that the Argentina's
refusal to offer restitution was a manifest violation of its obligation under international
law. The District Court responded by ruling that the failure of Argentina to recognize
its responsibilities as a nation did not empower it to create an ad hoc exception to the
FSIA. Id.
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The court principally relied on two unpublished district court opin-
ions which had rejected similar arguments that the ATS authorizes ju-
risdiction against foreign governments for violations of international
law. First, in Siderman v. Republic of Argentina,98 a claim was
brought directly against Argentina for torture and the taking of prop-
erty by the former military regime. In dismissing the action, the court
reviewed the legal history of foreign sovereign immunity and concluded
that the ATS did not provide an exception to foreign sovereign immu-
nity for a violation of international law. 99 Second, in In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of September 1, 1982,100 the court dismissed wrongful
death claims brought against the Soviet Union arising from the down-
ing of Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1, 1983, when it
strayed into Soviet territory. Although the court relied on both the
FSIA and the act of state doctrine, it found no basis for interpreting a
collateral statute authorizing jurisdiction for actions against foreign
governments beyond the exceptions set forth in the FSIA.' 0
The district court recognized, however, that similar arguments had
been "incorrectly" accepted by the District Court for the District of
Columbia in Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R.' The district court responded to
Von Dardel by stating that the legislative history cited therein 1 3
merely states that Congress sought to adopt international standards to
preserve claims for violations of diplomatic immunity, not that immu-
nity would be waived for violations of international law. 04 The district
court concluded its analysis by commenting that it had addressed the
arguments "in greater detail than they merit, given the clarity of the
FSIA's language and the precedents that support this result.'
' 0 5
C. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court and held that federal jurisdiction could be
properly asserted over Argentina. The court based its decision on five
fundamental points. First, an attack on a neutral vessel was held to
violate "mutual" and "recognized" principles of international law. Sec-
98. No. 82-1772 (D.C. Cal. March 7, 1985).
99. Siderman, No. 82-1772, slip. op. at 3 (D.C. Cal. March 7, 1985) cited in
Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
100. Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1985).
101. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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ond, the ATS was interpreted as authorizing jurisdiction over an indi-
vidual or foreign sovereign for a violation of international law. Third,
the court ruled that there was no foreign sovereign immunity for viola-
tions of "settled" principles of international law. Fourth, the FSIA was
held as not preempting the jurisdictional grant of the ATS. Fifth, the
assertion of jurisdiction over Argentina did not violate any substantive
principles of due process.
The underlying premise of the Second Circuit's decision was that
Argentina violated customary principles of international law.106 The
court observed that whether a court faced with the circumstances of
this case in 1789 would have exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign was inconsequential. The court adopted the view in Filartiga and
revealed, in a phalanx of supply side judicial overreaching, the under-
pinnings of its reasoning:
We need not decide, however, whether a court faced with the cir-
cumstances of this case in 1789, the year the Alien Tort Statute
was enacted, would have exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign. In construing the Alien Tort Statute, courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today." 7
The court held that principles of innocent passage and the rights
of neutral shipping were uniformly accepted principles of international
law:'0 8 "[S]ince the sinking of a neutral vessel on the high seas without
justification violates a substantive principle of international law, no
matter who does the sinking, there is no immunity under international
law."' 0 9 The court held that Argentina's attack, combined with its re-
fusal to compensate, were "analogous to piracy" and were, thus, in vio-
lation of international law." 0 The court explained that:
106. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423.
107. Id. at 425.
108. Id. at 424.
109. Id. at 426.
110. Id. at 424. Specifically the majority opinion held that, as a matter of law, the
actions of Argentina violated the established boundaries of international conduct gov-
erning the relationship between warships and neutral merchant shipping on the high
seas. Id. See The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (because the act of
the German submarine commander in sinking the Lusitania, an unarmed British pas-
senger vessel, without warning and without making any provisions for the safety of
passengers and crew was illegal being in violation of the laws of nations recognized
even by Germany prior to the sinking of the Lusitania, the owners of the vessel were
not liable for the death of the passengers).
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[I]t is beyond controversy that attacking a neutral ship in interna-
tional waters, without proper cause for suspicion or investigation,
violates international law. . .[Furthermore] [w]here the attacker
has refused to compensate the neutral, such action is analogous to
piracy, one of the earliest recognized violations of international
law."'
The court held that Hess had established a claim of a violation of
international law under the ATS. 12 Thus, the court detailed that the
elements of a prima facie case under the ATS sustaining jurisdiction
were met in the instant case because: (1) Hess is a Liberian corpora-
tion and, therefore, an alien; (2) the action alleged the tort of attacking
a neutral vessel in international waters; and (3) the tort alleged is a
violation of international law."1 3
The Second Circuit rejected Argentina's contention that the FSIA
preempted any jurisdictional grant indigenous to the ATS.1 14 Argentina
argued that because the ATS was enacted at a time when a state en-
joyed absolute immunity, the lack of an express intent to provide juris-
diction in the ATS over a foreign sovereign indicated an intent to
maintain the grant of immunity. Therefore, the only actions which
could be asserted against a foreign sovereign were set forth within the
specific FSIA exceptions. The court disagreed with this argument and
ruled that as to the loss of a neutral merchant vessel in international
waters, the grant of sovereign immunity set forth within the FSIA did
not control the amenability to suit of a foreign sovereign for a violation
of international law. 15 Although admitting that Argentina's view of
the ATS could be traced to the statute's legislative history,"' the court
held that a close examination of the FSIA revealed that Congress did
not intend to remove the "existing remedy" under the ATS for viola-
111. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 424. The court added that "attacking a
merchant ship without warning or seizing a neutral's goods on the high seas requires
restitution."
112. Id.
113. Id. at 425.
114. Id. at 426. In support of its view that the FSIA preempted the jurisdictional
grant of the ATS, Argentina cited to the "comprehensive" language in the second cir-
cuit's opinion in O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M/V AMERICANA, 734 F.2d 115, 116
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1086 (1984) ("The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
insulates foreign states from the exercise of federal jurisdiction, except under the condi-
tions specified in the Act.").
115. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426.
116. Id.
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tions of international law."'
The court next reconciled any inconsistency in its interpretation of
the ATS and FSIA. The Second Circuit interpreted the ATS as a pre-
existing jurisdictional grant for an entire class of actions against for-
eign governments beyond the exceptions set forth within the FSIA. The
court held that the FSIA did not preempt the ATS's jurisdictional
grant for violations of international law because a United States court
generally denies immunity for violations of international law.11 The
court viewed the ATS as a straightforward and independent statute
vesting federal courts with jurisdiction for claims by aliens for viola-
tions of international law irrespective of the status of the defendant as
a foreign sovereign or individual." 9 The court reasoned that it was
merely preserving the validity and virtue of an existing jurisdictional
grant for violations of international law. Furthermore, the court indi-
cated that the jurisdictional character of ATS and the FSIA were in
pari passu to be applied with equal force with respect to a claim
against a foreign sovereign. 2 '
Anticipating the argument that its decision arbitrarily encroached
upon the intent of the statute, the court explained that the FSIA was
not intended to be the aegis for violations of international law.' The
court outlined the three objectives of the FSIA: (1) to incorporate into
United States law the "restrictive theory of sovereign immunity;" (2)
to insure the role of the judiciary in developing and applying the law as
an organic principle of the immunity; and (3) to provide a comprehen-
sive set of procedures to permit suits against foreign sovereigns. The
court explained that these objectives were not intended to eliminate the
jurisdictional grant of the ATS or alter its remedy for violations of
international law. 2 The court noted that international law violations
were simply not discussed in the FSIA or its legislative history outside
of the commercial context.12 3 Therefore, the ATS was held not to be
117. Id.
118. Id. at 426.
119. Id. at 425.
120. Id. at 427.
121. Id. at 426-27 ("A close examination or the legislative history of the FSIA
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to remove existing remedies in United
States courts for violations of international law of the kind presented here").
122. Id. at 427 ("Thus, international law violations were not the focus of the
'comprehensive' language of the drafters of the FSIA anymore than they were the fo-
cus of the Supreme Court in the Verlinden case. . . . The elimination [through the
FSIA] of the executive branch's role in making immunity decisions certainly does not
suggest an intent to provide immunity for violations of international law.").
123. Id.
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the focus of the "comprehensive" language of the drafters of the FSIA.
After this less than exhaustive analysis, the court found the legislative
history of the FSIA "devoid" of any indication that Congress intended
the FSIA to bar jurisdiction under a suit under the ATS for a violation
of international law:" 4
[A]lthough Congress did not focus on suits for violations of interna-
tional law, it clearly expected courts to apply the international law
of sovereign immunity. As we have seen, under international law,
Argentina would not be granted sovereign immunity in this case.
Therefore, a grant of immunity here would fly in the face of this
central premise. Since Congress did not express a clear intent to
contradict the immunity rules of international law, and, indeed, left
the Alien Tort Statute in force, we conclude that the FSIA does
not preempt the jurisdictional grant of the Alien Tort Statute. 125
Construing the FSIA to bar jurisdiction under the "unusual" cir-
cumstances of this case would, according to the court, actually frus-
trate the intent of the FSIA. The central premise of the Act is that
immunity determinations are to be made by the courts pursuant to its
exclusive statutory scheme. Thus, according to the court, although the
FSIA does not focus on suits for violations of international law, it
clearly expected courts to apply substantive principles of international
law to claims of sovereign immunity. Therefore, because Congress did
not express a clear intent to contradict what the court perceived as the
immunity standards of international law, the court held that the FSIA
was not intended to preempt the jurisdictional grant of the ATS over
violations of international law.120
The court further found that the exercise of jurisdiction over Ar-
gentina comported with accepted due process notions of minimum con-
tacts. 127 The court supported its reasoning by holding that the act of
piracy committed by Argentina is within a class of offenses under inter-
national law that "always have sufficient 'effects' within the United
124. Id. The court held that "[w]e would consider it odd to hold that, by enacting
a statute designed to narrow the scope of sovereign in the commercial context, Con-
gress, though silent on the subject, intended to broaden the scope of sovereign immu-
nity for violations of international law." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 428. Cf. Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34
STAN. L. REv. 385, 404-07 (1982).
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States to satisfy due process."28 As an alternative basis, the court ex-
plained that the actions alleged were sufficiently related to the United
States for Argentina to have been on notice that it would be subject to
the jurisdiction of United States courts:
Argentina was specifically notified by the United States that HER-
CULES would be passing through the South Atlantic on neutral
business, clearly revealing to Argentina a United States interest in
the ship and its safety. Furthermore, HERCULES was plying the
United States domestic trade, transporting oil from one part of the
United States to another part of the United States pursuant to a
contract that called for payment in the United States. Of course
Argentina was also aware of the obvious United States interest in
protecting the freedom of the high seas. 129
The court concluded its majority opinion by attempting to narrow
the decision to preempt the wholesale assertion of jurisdiction against
foreign governments by recognizing that:
The FSIA is the sole source from which a foreign sovereign may
obtain immunity and ordinarily, it is the only basis on which a
court can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. However,
where an alien sues a foreign sovereign for a violation of interna-
tional law, Congress has provided subject matter jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute .... The class of actions that are recognized
as international law violations, as distinguished from a mere tort, is
quite small. Moreover, the sovereign defendant or its action must
have sufficient contacts to satisfy the constitutional requirements of
personal jurisdiction. And finally, the procedural requirements of
the FSIA, restricting execution of judgment for example ... would
still have to be considered.13 0
The court noted that its decision may inevitably invite legislative
repeal:
We realize that the question of the effect of these two statutes en-
acted by Congress is a difficult one. We are heartened by the
128. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d. at 428.
129. Id. The majority also explained that "lc]onsiderations of fairness also weigh
in favor of exercising jurisdiction since appellants have sought redress of their griev-
ances in Argentina and were unable to obtain even a hearing". Id.
130. Id.
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knowledge that, if we are mistaken, there is no bar to a statutory
remedy. It should also be noted that the burden on a plaintiff mov-
ing under the Alien Tort Statute remains great.'31
The suggestion that the ATS sanctioned jurisdiction over an
alien's claim against a government for a violation of international law
produced a strong dissent.' 32 The dissenter viewed the majority opinion
as substituting its judgment for the unqualified Congressional intention
to detail jurisdiction over foreign governments within the FSIA. The
dissent reasoned that it was clear from both the statutory language and
the legislative history that: (1) the FSIA provided the exclusive frame-
work to resolve a foreign sovereign's claim to immunity; and (2) within
that framework, recognition of such immunity is to be the rule, subject
only to such exceptions as are expressly provided in the statute. Be-
cause the FSIA did not set forth an applicable exception denying im-
munity to Argentina, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
claim.133
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Interference with the Conduct of Foreign Affairs
1. General Principles
The control and conduct of foreign policy is vested within the Ex-
ecutive and Congress.134 The validity of this doctrine, as it relates to
the Executive, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,'36 which referred to the "very deli-
cate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations."' 36 Conse-
131. Id. at 429.
132. Id. at 429-30 (Kearse, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that:
[Elven assuming that when Congress passed the Alien Tort Statute in 1789 it
intended to allow federal subject-matter jurisdiction to ebb and flow with the vicis-
situdes of "evolving standards of international law," a premise of which I am skep-
tical, I cannot see how we can properly disregard the clearly restrictive provisions
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. . .which were "intended to preempt any
other State or Federal law. . .for according immunity to foreign sovereigns.
Id.
133. Id.
134. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284
(1988).
135. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
136. Id. at 319-20.
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quently, judicial forays into the conduct of foreign policy have been
largely foreclosed through the act of state doctrine and other prophy-
lactic measures. The Amerada Hess decision upholding federal juris-
diction over a claim arising out of the conduct of the armed forces of a
foreign government is contrary to the prohibition against judicial inter-
ference with foreign affairs. Furthermore, it may seriously usurp the
Executive's constitutional discretion to conduct foreign policy.
131
The reasoning behind limiting judicial expeditions into the area of
foreign affairs was recently analyzed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In Smith v. Reagan,'3 8 several relatives
of American servicemen missing in action in the Vietnam War brought
suit against the President, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, seeking a declaration
that American prisoners continue to be held in captivity in Southeast
Asia. The district court dismissed a portion of the lawsuit and held that
because the claim directly involved foreign policy decisions, its adjudi-
cation would squarely interfere with the Executive's discretion to con-
duct foreign policy. 39
The Fourth Circuit went beyond the district court's opinion and
dismissed the entire action. The appellate court held that it lacked any
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the
foreign policy question and understood the "peril" inherent in its adju-
dication of the issue: 4 °
[The plaintiffs] ask the courts to determine whether American ser-
vice personnel remain in captivity in southeast Asia and to assess
the adequacy of the executive's efforts to secure the release of any
who do. Either course of action is fraught with peril for the judici-
ary. In order to grant the relief requested, the courts would be
asked to intrude in the conduct of sensitive diplomatic negotiations.
Furthermore, they would be asked to make determinations of fact
in an area where the judiciary lacks power to obtain information,
and in which it has neither expertise to evaluate the information
brought before it nor standards to guide its review. Finally, as dif-
ferent courts address these issues, the judiciary may speak with
multiple voices in an area where it is imperative that the nation
speak as one. These difficulties lead us to conclude that this suit
137. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
138. No. 87-1661 (4th Cir. April 18, 1988).
139. Smith v. Reagan, 637 F. Supp. 964, 967 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
140. Id.
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presents a nonjusticiable political question.141
The court reasoned that the action presented issues which were
"constitutionally committed" to the Executive. The court recognized
the possible implication of its decision on the Executive's conduct of
foreign affairs:
Plaintiffs seek in this suit to investigate and evaluate the Executive
branch's conduct of foreign policy, an area traditionally reserved to
the political branches and removed from judicial review. . . .Not
every suit that touches on foreign relations is beyond judicial cogni-
zance. A cause of action under the Hostage Act, however, would
inescapably involve courts in matters of the most delicate diplo-
macy. A charge that a foreign government has "unjustly deprived"
an American citizen of liberty is likely to have far-reaching and
unforeseeable effects on the conduct of foreign relations.14
The court prudently realized that the judiciary was "unschooled in the
delicacies of diplomatic negotiations [and] the inevitable bargaining for
the best solution of an international conflict."1 43 The court explained
that:
Plaintiffs would simply place too many actors on the diplomatic
stage. The Supreme Court noted in Baker that issues involving for-
eign relations often pose political questions because, in part, they
"uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's
views. . . ." It is important that this country speak with a single,
clear voice. . . .Pronouncements by the federal courts may differ
sharply from those of the executive, and might themselves not be
141. Smith, No. 87-1661, slip. op. at 6 (4th Cir. April 18, 1988).
142. Id. at 8-9. The Fourth Circuit quoted extensively from the Supreme Court's
decision in Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948). The Supreme Court stated in Chicago & Southern that:
[Tihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judi-
cial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political depart-
ments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities
nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of politi-
cal power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Chicago & Southern, 333 U.S. at 111 cited in Smith, No. 87-1661, slip op. at 8-9 (4th
Cir. April 18, 1988).
143. Id.
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consistent."'
Consequently, the court abstained from an independent inquiry into
sensitive foreign policy matters in order to avoid the infraction on the
Executive's discretion to conduct foreign policy.145
The considerations addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Smith are
not unique to that case. A court's adjudication of a claim involving
foreign policy issues presents numerous perils for the judiciary. Regard-
less of the particular issue, the court would most likely be forced to
move beyond mere determinations of immunity and to intrude directly
into the conduct of diplomacy. The court would also be compelled to
make determinations of fact in an area where it lacked any expertise or
authority to obtain information. Finally, the standards of review would
be more arbitrary than consistent with any legal or political principles.
2. Diplomatic Redress
A centerpiece of the management of foreign policy is the role of
the Executive and Congress, not the courts, in seeking redress against a
foreign sovereign for a violation of international law." 6 On Monday,
144. Id. at 11 (citations omitted). The court in Smith noted that:
The courts also lack the powers for the task which plaintiffs would have them
undertake. The political branches have worked for years, since the end of Ameri-
can involvement in hostilities in southeast Asia, to obtain a full accounting of miss-
ing Americans from foreign governments. The courts, which lack even the limited
tools of diplomatic leverage, are unlikely to be more successful in obtaining infor-
mation from those governments. Further, the courts lack the expertise to evaluate
what information would be laid before them. Much of the evidence proffered by
plaintiffs consists of intelligence reports, with which courts are inexpert and unfa-
miliar. In the end, evaluation of this information requires not so much the applica-
tion of law as the exercise of judgment. That judgment should be made by the
political branches of our government.
Id. at 13.
145. Id. at 10.
146. See Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313 (D.D.C. 1985). In
holding that El Salvador was immune from suit, the district court explained that:
[T]he violent death of an American abroad is a tragic occurrence. By virtue of
their offices, United States diplomatic officials have the obligation to use their best
efforts to protect and assist American citizens and their families in dealing with
events in foreign lands, and to conduct vigorous inquiries and to take other diplo-
matic and political action when foreign governments do not provide adequate pro-
tection to the citizens of this nation. These, in fact, are among the reasons why the
United States maintains vast ambassadorial and consular establishments around
the world. See generally, 22 C.F.R. § 71.1. But the manner in which these obliga-
tions are exercised, and the conduct of foreign relations generally, are constitution-
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July 4, 1988, The New York Times reported that the USS VIN-
CENNES had mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane over
the Persian Gulf killing 290 passengers.14 7 Two days later it was re-
ported that the United States was contemplating paying the victims'
relatives compensation. 1 8 On July 12, 1988, the Reagan Administra-
tion publicly announced that the United States would offer compensa-
tion, ex gratia, without admitting culpability or liability. 49
ally entrusted to the Executive Branch, with oversight by the Congress, not to the
Judiciary. . . . For a court to hold executive officials liable in damages because in
its view their inquiry on foreign soil was not sufficiently vigorous, their pressure on
a foreign government not sufficiently severe, or the information they released not
sufficiently extensive, would be to involve the Judicial Branch in matters with re-
spect to which it has neither expertise nor jurisdiction. These are highly judgmen-
tal matters, and the officials to whom decision thereon is entrusted are for that
reason protected from damage suits by the immunity doctrines discussed above.
Id. at 1321-22; but see Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 33, (arguing that
shipowners whose vessels had been seized or destroyed have historically not sought re-
lief by diplomatic means through their flag state but by trial in the admiralty court).
147. U.S. Downs Iran Airliner Mistaken for F-14; 290 Reported Dead; A Trag-
edy, Reagan Says, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1988, at Al, Col. 6.
148. U.S. Weighs Paying Victims' Relatives in Downing of Jet, N.Y. Times, July
6, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
149. U.S. Compensation Will be Provided in Airbus Downing, N.Y. Times, July
12, 1988, at Al, col. 6 (payments reportedly would be made to the individuals directly
through international aid organizations); but see Calculation Mixes with Compassion,
N.Y. Times, July 18, 1988, A14, col. 1 (discussing congressional opposition to compen-
sation payment); see also The Roots and the Rudiments of Compensation to Foreign-
ers, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1988, A18, col. 1:
The practice in which one country makes amends for misfortune visited on another
country's citizens has deep roots in modern diplomacy and international law. Inter-
national law generally imposes no obligation to compensate civilians injured in
wartime. But the United States has made a number of voluntary settlements, in-
cluding $1.6 million paid to some 700 people who suffered injuries or property lost
in the 1983 invasion of Grenada. This group included the families of 18 patients
who died when American forces accidentally bombed a mental hospital. In World
War II, the United States paid Switzerland $4 million as compensation for an
accidental full-scale bombing raid on the town of Schaffhausen. One of the most
famous cases resulting in compensation to the United States involved a Confeder-
ate ship, the Alabama, which sank 65 Union ships before going down in a spectac-
ular sea duel off Normandy with the Union warship Kearsarge. The Alabama was
built under contract to the Confederacy by a shipyard in Liverpool. Despite warn-
ings by the American Ambassador, the British claim for damages against Britain
became the subject of the first major international arbitration, which in 1871
found Britain liable for the damage caused by the Alabama and ordered it to pay
$15.5 million. In the most recent case that is roughly comparable, Israel met the
full United States demand for $7 million compensation for the 34 seamen killed
and 75 injured in an Israeli air and sea attack on the intelligence ship Liberty in
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On January 31, 1988, The New York Times reported that the
United States, through its State and Defense Departments, was prepar-
ing to submit a multimillion dollar claim against Iraq for compensation
for the death of thirty seven sailors caused by the Iraqi attack on the
guided missile frigate STARK in the Persian Gulf on May 17, 1987.15
It was reported that this compensation claim would be eventually ac-
companied by two additional submissions seeking compensation for the
injuries suffered by other crewmen and reimbursement for the repair of
the vessel."' Claims for compensation, involving an attack on a neutral
vessel should involve, as the VINCENNES and STARK incidents il-
lustrate, government to government diplomatic negotiations,15 ' not ju-
dicial proceedings and civil penalties. Granting competing avenues of
recourse in the federal courts, thus, serves only to subvert and disrupt
the traditional foreign responsibilities of the Executive.15
the 1967 war in the Middle East. In 1973, Israel shot down a Libyan passenger
plane over the Sinai, killing 108, and paid Libya $3 million. In 1983, the United
States sought compensation from the Soviet Union for the 30 American citizens
who were among the 269 victims of the shooting down of a South Korean airliner.
But the Soviet Government would not even receive the diplomatic notice contain-
ing the request.
150. See U.S. Seeks Iraqi Payments for Kin of Stark's Dead, N.Y. Times, Jan.
31, 1988, at A13, col. I.
151. Id. It was reported that the United States government was relying on the
precedent set in the case of the Israeli attack on the American intelligence ship LIB-
ERTY during the 1967 Middle East War. "In 1968, Israel paid the United States
nearly $7 million for the families of the 34 seamen killed in the attack and for wounds
suffered by 75 crew members. But the issue remained divisive until 1980, when the
Israelis also agreed to pay $6 million for damage to the vessel." Id. In the Joint Re-
sponse for Appellants submitted in a letter to the Clerk of the Court for the Second
Circuit dated July 23, 1987, the owner and charterer argued that the universal right of
neutral vessels to free passage was "reaffirmed" by the STARK incident. The right
may have been recognized, but the appendage consensus as to the proper recourse is,
however, disputed. The point of the STARK incident is not that it may pertain to the
right of free passage, but, rather, how it may relate to the proper recourse for the
interruption of freedom of navigation. The STARK retribution was obtained through
diplomatic means.
152. In fact, senior officials of the Argentine Embassy were summoned to the
United States Department of State where a formal "oral demarche" was delivered re-
garding the attack. See Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 7.
153. The United States has traditionally provided its citizens recovery for injury
resulting from an armed conflict, See, e.g., the War Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2017a(b)
(1982)"
The Commission is directed to receive and to determine according to the provi-
sions of this title [sections 2017-2017p of this Appendix] the validity and amount
of claims of nationals of the United States for. . .(b) damage to, or loss or de-
struction of, ships or ship cargoes directly or indirectly owned by a national of the
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3. Diplomatic Disruption
The claim against Argentina in Amerada Hess raises sensitive is-
sues affecting American foreign policy in South America. The judicial
pronouncement that the conduct of Argentina's armed forces violated
international law does not, and cannot, adequately reflect the diplo-
matic consequences of such an official condemnation on the legitimacy
and integrity of a foreign state. In spite of the fact that Argentina is
passing through a fragile and transitional stage of democracy"' and is
confronted with a massive international debt obligation,155 Argentina
has been placed in jeopardy of responding to a twelve million dollar
civil judgment in a United States court as a result of the acts of the
former military government's combat operations during the Falklands
war. In the crucible of foreign policy debate, a court's inherent inability
to synthesize the social, economic, military and political consequences
of a judicial pronouncement on the legitimacy of a foreign state, estab-
lishes the justification for limiting any jurisdictional grant to those ac-
tions contemplated by Congress and detailed in the FSIA. A meddle-
some decision based upon disputed principles of international law
would serve only to undermine United States diplomatic prestige. Is-
sues involving sensitive foreign policy judgments should actuate a court
United States at the time such damage, loss, or destruction occurred, which was a
direct consequence of military action by Germany or Japan during the period be-
ginning September 1, 1939, and ending September 2, 1945; no award shall be
made under this subsection in favor of any insurer or reinsurer as assignee or
otherwise as successor in interest to the right of the insured ...
154. See Argentina Troops Move on Rebel Soldiers at Base, N.Y. Times, Jan.
18, 1988, at A3, col. 3 (rebel soldiers threaten second coup against elected Government
of President Raul Alfonsin); Failed Argentina Coup Reflects Military's Inclinations on
Democracy, Latin Generals Remain Unconvinced, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, at E3,
col 1 (revolt by Argentine Lt. Colonel in January of 1988 reflected failure of demo-
cratic government to persuade armed forces to respect and accept democracy); Rebels
Hint New Actions In Argentine, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at A5, col. 1 (military
officers intend to continue opposition to Argentine democratic government); Corruption
Cases Rise in Argentina, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, at A9, col. 1; Drug Traffic Rises
Sharply in Argentina, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A5, col. 1; Argentine Jurists
Shed Anonymity, Emerge as New Heroes of Democracy, Wash. Post, May 6, 1988, at
A24, col. 3.
155. See Argentina Still Can't Pay Its Debt, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1988, at D10,
col 1. (official report crisis looming due to Argentina's 54 billion dollar debt). Argen-
tina's Economy Seen as Out of Control, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1988, at D14, col. 5
("After six years of the foreign debt crisis and four years of democratic government,
the Argentine economy today is widely viewed as exhausted, chaotic and out of con-
trol."). For a thorough discussion of the Latin American debt crisis see Kuczynski, The
Outlook for Latin American Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129 (1988),
1988]
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to more accurately focus on whether the claim alleged falls within the
purview of the explicit statutory immunity exceptions set forth within
the FSIA and to veer away from assuming a competitive role as an
active foreign policy formulator." 6
Finally, the de facto review of Argentina's action would be an in-
appropriate retrospective interference with the United States diplo-
matic judgment during the Falklands war itself and set the precedent
permitting the courts to second-guess foreign policy judgments. The
Falklands war drew very intense American diplomatic efforts due to
the European and Latin American consequences of the war on United
States standing in those regions. Initially, the United States attempted
to preserve and maintain a neutral position.'57 The Reagan Adminis-
tration attempted to mediate the dispute through "frenetic" shuttle di-
plomacy. 58 However, as a diplomatic solution appeared to be improba-
156. See Lawsuit Dismissed on Ship That Struck Mine, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1987, at A10, col 1. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
157. See Everybody's Friend, THE ECONOMIST, April 10, 1982, at 22 (discussing
the attempt by the United States to shield itself from having to absorb any animosity
generated among the Latin American governments); But see In Latin America,
Noriega Is a Principle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, at E3, col. i:
Yet the reality of United States power also defines the reality for Latin America.
And, in practice, no big Latin American nation has allowed its relations with
Washington to be poisoned by disagreements over how to deal with General
Noriega. To some extent, this is because the region's acute economic troubles have
sapped its political strength and increased its dependence on the United States.
More fundamentally, it is because bilateral ties with the Untied States have al-
ways won out over regional solidarity. The 1982 war between Britain and Argen-
tina over the Falkland Islands was a case in point. At the time, many officials in
Washington feared that their support for Britain would permanently scar relations
with Latin America, but today it is merely remembered as evideace of the region's
secondary importance to the United States. Similarly, the Reagan Administration
has been deeply involved in Central America in the 1980's, but it has paid rela-
tively little attention to its relations with South american countries, which are
more concerned with seeking relief from their foreign debt problems than with
Central America.
158. The Fleet Gets Closer than a Solution, THE ECONOMIST, April 17, 1982, at
19. See also Conservatives for Argentina,-THE ECONOMIST, April 24, 1984, at 22-26:
When President Reagan's national security council convened on Wednesday morn-
ing, its assessment of the Falkland Islands crisis was grim. Mr. Alexander Haig,
the secretary of state, had spent virtually all of his time for ten days attempting to
negotiate a solution, only to find that Argentina's last, best offer fell short of the
British requirement that the wishes of the islanders themselves be taken into ac-
count .... Mr. Reagan found himself appealing to both sides to give the United
States more time to try to work something out .... The Reagan administration
has not got any new tricks in its bag, but the prospect of a shooting war between
Britain and Argentina poses a desperate dilemma for American policy makers.
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ble, the United States moved toward siding with Great Britain."5 9 On
May 1, 1982, the Reagan Administration made the political judgment
and publicly allied itself with Great Britain.'60
There exists virtually no distinction between the Reagan Adminis-
tration's political judgment of May, 1982, and the court's legal decision
in September, 1988, except possibly that the political decision was bet-
ter informed. Each decision involves a judgment of the legitimacy of a
foreign sovereign's national security policy. Furthermore, because of
the unfavorable political view of the military regime which controlled
Argentina during the Falklands War, the Amerada Hess decision was
mostly made with relative ease. However, if the political circumstances
had been different, or the attack on the HERCULES had been under-
taken by British Hannier jets, the court's decision may well have been
different. That issue aside, the foreign policy implications inherent
within any decision directed at the legitimacy of Argentina's conduct
during the war are readily apparent.
The decision in Amerada Hess fails to address appendage consti-
tutional issues associated with its judicial surfeit into the independent
Public opinion is sympathetic to Britain, but Washington opinion is irritated that
the country's foreign policy is being immobilized by the Falklands affair .... Iron-
ically, Mr. Haig's intense involvement in this matter-and his Kissingeresque at-
tempts at shuttle diplomacy-may have served to increase the American stake in a
resolution of the Falklands dispute. Mr. Haig has been roundly criticized in for-
eign policy circles for possibly having plunged in too soon and too thoroughly,
without any reasonable likelihood of success. If he does fail, that could not only
appear to be a failure of American foreign policy, but might also further damage
the secretary of state's already shaky political standing.
159. Id. Additionally:
With Mr. Alexander Haig on his way to Buenos Aires on April 15th for his second
visit and seventh day of continuous shuttling, it became clear that the United
States was moving from its role as mediator in the Falklands dispute towards be-
ing an ally of Britain again. If General Galtieri is unwilling to withdraw Argen-
tina's troops from the islands without any but the barest of preconditions, the
United States is ready to support the British case and impose penalties, maybe
including trade sanctions, against Argentina....
160. Mayday in the South Atlantic, supra note 82, at 20:
The Americans, exasperated by Argentina's conflicting authorities, came down
with unexpected firmness on Britain's side on May 1st. Mr. Alexander Haig, the
American secretary of state, branded Argentina an aggressor, and announced a
series of measures against the country, including a ban on military sales, a freeze
on credits, and most important, an offer to respond positively to requests for mate-
rial support from British forces. The American Navy is preparing two tankers to
assist the British replenishment fleet. America's decision to get off the fence risked
arousing traditional anti-gringo ire elsewhere in Latin America as well as in Ar-
gentina, and made the United States unacceptable as sole mediator. . ..
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province of the Executive and the Congress and indicates an insensitiv-
ity to the reality of conducting foreign affairs.' Judicial decisions af-
fecting foreign policy necessitate precise and accurate opinions which
refrain from asserting political judgments and declaring that the con-
duct of a foreign sovereign's armed forces was illegal.' 62
This is not a case where the court's interference with foreign pol-
icy is authorized by statute. For example, the federal courts were used
161. On December 12, 1987, the New York Times reported that:
A Federal judge had dismissed a lawsuit that sought $1.6 million from the United
States Government in connection with a Norwegian cargo ship that was damaged
by a mine two years ago in Nicaraguan harbor. The owner of the ship and a
Norwegian insurance concern had filed the suit on the ground that the Central
Intelligence Agency had negligently and maliciously mined the harbor with Presi-
dent Reagan's approval. In dismissing the suit, Judge Charles H. Tenney of Fed-
eral District Court in Manhattan ruled that the case had raised "political ques-
tions" that a court could not adjudicate. "To avoid becoming embroiled in
sensitive foreign policy matters such as this one," Judge Tenney declared, "the
court declines to interpose its own will above the will of the President or the Con-
gress.". . . The suit was filed by the Chaser Shipping Corporation, owner of the
ship, the Iver Chaser, and the Norwegian War Risk Insurance for Ships. The Iver
Chaser, registered in Liberia, was carrying a cargo of molasses and benzene when
it was extensively damaged by a mine in the harbor at Corinto, Nicaragua. Judge
Tenney said the suit sought to recover damages on the theory that "the Govern-
ment violated a duty to innocent third-party vessels" by failing to comply with an
established practice of warning ships that mines had been placed in the harbor.
The Government contended, the judge continued, that the constitutional separa-
tion of powers would be violated if the court conducted a judicial analysis of "the
high-level C.I.A. and Presidential activities alleged by plaintiffs.". . . Judge Ten-
ney observed that the Government would certainly refuse to provide the "classified
intelligence documents" that would be needed as evidence if the case went to trial.
Even if plaintiffs were accorded access to intelligence documents concerning the
mining of the harbor at Corinto," he said, "the court would be incapable of assess-
ing the underlying military and diplomatic considerations which resulted in the
decision to place the mines without warning to innocent third-party vessels." If he
adjudicated the claims in the suit, Judge Tenney said, he would be compelled to
resolve "sensitive issues involving the foreign policy conduct of executive branch
officials." The judge also cited decisions of the United States Supreme Court that
cautioned against judicial monitoring of covert military operations, whether before
or after they happened. He described the suit as "an action by two foreign entities
seeking damages for injuries suffered in foreign waters due to covert mining opera-
tions conducted there by the executive branch."
See Lawsuit Dismissed on Ship That Struck Mine, supra note 156.
162. The owner and charterer stated in their joint brief in the Second Circuit that
such would be the case in Argentina: "The same firm [Abeledo & Gottheily Associates
of Argentina] sent an opinion of the National Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina
whereby the Court held it had no jurisdiction for acts committed by government agen-
cies during the [Falklands] war," Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 10.
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by the Reagan Administration to further assert economic sanctions
against Panama and the regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega.
On March 8, 1988, The New York Times reported that the District
Court for the Southern District of New York extended a restraining
order preventing two banks from transferring money to the National
Bank of Panama. The court's action certainly had an effect on foreign
policy. Its order, however, was based upon a 1941 federal statute au-
thorizing the seizure of German and Japanese bank accounts in the
United States during World War 11.111 Absent such statutory authori-
zation, a court's decision affecting foreign policy is inherently unsound.
Courts lack the experience and expertise to appreciate the nu-
ances, sensitivities and multi-dimensional considerations which con-
sume the conduct of American foreign policy.16' In spite of these con-
cerns, the Second Circuit has imprudently fashioned a rule of law
which substitutes its judgment for the diplomatic skill of the United
States government. By opting for a broad interpretation of the ATS
and a narrow view of foreign sovereign immunity, the court has moved
beyond the constitutional parameters of palatable judicial interference
with the tenor of United States diplomatic relations. 6 5
163. See U.S. Court Extends Panama Bank Curb, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1988,
at A3, col. 1.
164. In Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the district court held:
The Court concludes that the fact finding that would be necessary to determine
whether U.S. forces have been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities in
El Salvador renders this case in its current posture non-justiciable. The questions
as to the nature and extent of the United States' presence in El Salvador and
whether a report under the WPR is mandated because our forces have been sub-
ject to hostile fire or are taking part in war effort are appropriate for congres-
sional, not judicial, investigation and determination. Further, in order to determine
the application of the 60-day provision, the Court would be required to decide at
exactly what point in time U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities or im-
minent hostilities, and whether that situation continues to exist. This inquiry
would be even more inappropriate for the judiciary .... The question presented
does require judicial inquiry into sensitive military matters. Even if the plaintiffs
could introduce admissible evidence concerning the state of hostilities in various
geographical areas in El Salvador where U.S. forces are stationed and the exact
nature of U.S. participation in the conflict (and this information may well be un-
available except through inadmissible newspaper articles), the Court no doubt
would be presented conflicting evidence on those issues by defendants. The Court
lacks the resources and expertise (which are accessible to the Congress) to resolve
disputed questions of fact concerning the military situation in El Salvador.
165. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
which stated:
We have no doubt that these considerations of institutional competence preclude
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B. A Convenient Principle of International Law
As a general rule, federal jurisdiction does not extend to questions
involving the conduct of United States foreign policy. 166 Particular ex-
ceptions have arisen when: (1) the question is precisely defined; (2) the
standards of adjudication are appropriately clear; and (3) the courts
act pursuant to authority specifically granted or reasonably contem-
plated by Congress.1 67 More specifically, the exercise of jurisdiction
pursuant to the ATS must be based upon clear and settled principles of
international law.118 Absent precise and accepted principles of interna-
tional law, the court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to the ATS.
The exercise of federal jurisdiction in Amerada Hess does not fit
within any abstention exception and more importantly, the claim in
Amerada Hess is based upon convenient and disputed principles of in-
ternational law. The decision in Amerada Hess demonstrates a superfi-
cial understanding of international law in the maritime context. The
decision relies on principles of freedom of navigation and innocent pas-
sage, but an adroit analysis reveals that the scope of these rights is both
disputed and politically sensitive. As recently as February 13, 1988,
The New York Times reported that conflicting interpretations of these
principles had caused a diplomatic incident in the Black Sea when two
United States warships, the destroyer CARON and the cruiser YORK-
TOWN, sailed within the 12-mile limit that the Soviet Union claimed
judicial creation of damage remedies here. Just as the special needs of the armed
forces require the courts to save to Congress the creation of damage remedies
against military officers for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of soldiers, so also
the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage
remedies against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional
treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implica-
tions of suits such as this cannot be ignored - their ability to produce what the
Supreme Court has called in another context "embarrassment of our government
abroad" through "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710 7 L.Ed.2d
663 (1962). Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of
geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter the dan-
ger of foreign citizens' using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct the
foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we must leave to Con-
gress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.
166. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy
are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention"); accord Dames & Moore v. Rea-
gan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
167. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 825.
168. Id. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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as its territorial waters.1 9 The American warships sought to exercise
the "right to innocent passage," but were "bumped" by the Soviet
navy, which evidently held a contrary view of what the Second Circuit
construed as "settled" and established international legal principles.17 0
Almost two hundred years of American diplomatic history reflect
a constant international tension surrounding principles of "freedom of
navigation." Disputes concerning the rights of neutral shipping form
the basis of at least three diplomatic junctures in American history: (1)
169. See 2 Soviet Warships Reportedly Nudge U.S. Navy Vessels, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1988, at Al, col 1:
The American ships had entered the 12-mile limit claimed by the Soviet Union as
part of a Navy policy of occasionally asserting the right of passage in waters ex-
ceeding the 3-mile territorial limit recognized by the United States .... Like most
countries, the Soviet Union maintains that its waters extend 12 miles from its
shore, a limit that is recognized by the International Law of the Sea Treaty, which
the United States has not signed. The United States only claims a three-mile limit
for its own territorial waters .... Under international law, nations are supposed to
allow free passage to vessels operating peacefully in short transits across territorial
waters. But the Soviet Union has insisted that only certain sea lanes running be-
tween commonly visited areas can be used in this fashion.
170. See also, Letter to Editor from Professor Josef Silverstein, Rutgers Univer-
sity U.S. Ships Broke Law in Black Sea Scrape, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1988, at A30,
col. 3. The letter claimed:
The United States has an announced policy on the issues of the territorial sea and
the rights of innocent passage, to which our vessels did not adhere .... On March
10, 1983, President Reagan announced an oceans policy. He did so because a year
earlier he refused to allow his representatives to initial the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, which the United States and all maritime nations had worked on for 10
years. In his oceans policy he said that the convention included provisions on the
traditional uses of the oceans that "generally confirm existing maritime law and
practice and fairly balance the interests of all states.". . . He then declared that
the United States "will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their
coasts, as reflected in the convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the
United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal
states. . . . The Law of the Sea Treaty is very specific about the breadth of the
territorial sea: every state has the right to declare up to 12 miles as the width of its
territorial sea. It is equally specific in defining innocent passage: "passage is inno-
cent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal state." Among its definitions of prejudicial behavior is "any act aimed at
collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal
state.". . . If Mr. Reagan meant what he said nearly five years ago, our ships
should not have been inside the Soviet-declared 12-mile territorial sea for the pur-
poses of spying. . . . If the United States is a nation under law, then treaties,
customary international law and Presidential declarations upholding both must be
observed. In the Black Sea we broke the law, and we should recognize that our
actions only furthered disrespect for the law and undermined our credibility when
we accuse others of doing the same.
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the Napoleonic wars; (2) the American Civil War; and (3) World War
I. These events demonstrate the lack of consensus afforded legal princi-
ples which the Second Circuit has claimed to be "settled."
A review of American diplomatic history during the Napoleonic
wars reveals a malignant failure of the United States to protect and
preserve its neutral shipping rights. Throughout this period, France and
England waged economic warfare by instituting maritime blockades
and interrupting neutral shipping. American merchant vessels were
constantly harassed and threatened and their right to innocent passage
was frequently violated.1 1 In 1804, a British warship attacked an
American merchant vessel and killed a member of its crew. On June
22, 1807, the attack on the American warship CHESAPEAKE approx-
imately ten miles off the American coast resulted in the deaths of three
American seamen and the wounding of eighteen others. Furthermore,
the British Navy seized numerous merchant vessels or detained hun-
dreds of American seamen. The lack of an international consensus to
protect the rights of American neutral shipping was one of the causal
facts that eventually led to the War of 1812.172
The political and military reality of this period is reflected in the
observation of the diplomatic historian Daniel Smith:
The harsh truth is that no body of generally accepted neutral rights
existed in 1793. Small navy powers with substantial commercial in-
terests had long contended that as neutrals they had a right to con-
tinue trading freely with other neutrals and even with the belliger-
ents during a war, except in contraband goods directly related to
military use. They held that lists of contraband goods should be
severely limited, that belligerent blockades of enemy coasts should
be actually effective in order to be legal, and that enemy-owned
goods aboard neutral vessels should be immune from confiscation,
as "free ships make free goods." Great naval powers such as Eng-
land, on the other hand, naturally sought to control neutral com-
merce and to strike hard at the economy of an opponent. In their
hand contraband lists tended to expand to include foodstuffs and
naval stores, normally considered civilian goods, and other materi-
als capable of either civilian or military use. The "consolato del
mare," or so-called law of the sea, made enemy goods subject to
seizure even if carried under a neutral flag. In the unilaterally pro-
171. See HARRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 1789-
1877, at 98-103, 105-07 (1972).
172. See D. SMITH, THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE, 49-62 (1972).
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claimed "Rule of War of 1756," England prohibited neutral trade
in wartime that was not open in times of peace. By this proclama-
tion she intended to prevent an opponent from opening its colonies
to neutrals in order to compensate for its own naval weaknesses. In
practice, belligerents also frequently announced "paper blockades"
that could not be effectively enforced, to frighten neutrals and to
justify random interference with their commerce."'
During the American Civil War, the United States conveniently
abandoned its liberal stance on neutral shipping rights in favor of the
military necessity of a coercive maritime naval strategy. Union war-
ships instituted a blockade of Southern ports and seized neutral vessels
in international waters. The Union's naval vessels frequently violated
the rights of neutrals by entering the three-mile territorial limit to in-
tercept shipments intended for the Confederacy. 7 4
The legality of this blockade was upheld by the Supreme Court in
the Prize Cases.76 The claimants in the Prize Cases were shipowners,
including foreigners as well as United States citizens, who challenged
the legality of the Union's seizure of neutral ships and confiscation of
cargoes. The Court rejected these claims and held that:
Neutrals have a right to challenge the existence of a blockage de
facto, and also the authority of the party exercising the right to
institute it. They have a right to enter the ports of a friendly nation
for the purposes of trade and commerce, but are bound to recognize
the rights of a belligerent engaged in actual war, to use this mode
of coercion, for the purpose of subduing the enemy .... The right
of prize and capture has its origin in the "jus belli," and is gov-
erned and adjudged under the laws of nations. To legitimate the
capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war must
exist de facto, and the neutral must have a knowledge or notice of
the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use this mode of
coercion against a port, city or territory, in possession of the other.
Let us inquire whether, at the time this blockade was instituted, a
state of war existed which would justify a resort to these means of
subduing the hostile force .... On this first question, therefore, we
are of the opinion that the President had a right, jure belli, to insti-
tute a blockade of ports in possession of the States in rebellion
173. Id. at 49-50.
174. Id. at 163-65.
175. See Preceat v. United States, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 459 (1862).
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which neutrals are bound to regard.... .'
Again, the real consensus afforded these principles of freedom of navi-
gation during this period is summarized by Professor Smith:
The reversal of America's historic role during the Civil War reveals
a basic fact of international life: national survival necessarily out-
weighs mere consideration of ideals and principle .... JO~fficially
sanctioned departures from America's past practices indicated only
too clearly the expediential nature of so-called international law
and morality. 177
In World War I, the United States conveniently reverted to its
position as an advocate of neutral shipping rights and attempted to
compel respect for the rights of its neutral shipping. These attempts
were impotent when matched against Britain's determination to use the
Royal Navy, as in the Napoleonic Wars, to disrupt neutral trade to the
European continent. Despite direct State Department protests concern-
ing the interference with American shipping and neutral rights under
international law, Britain detained American ships and seized cargoes
consigned to neutral European countries.17 The German maritime
strategy relied on submarine warfare rather than surface warships to
execute its economic blockade. On February 4, 1915, Germany pro-
claimed that all "belligerent" shipping would be subject to submarine
attacks without warning and without making provisions for the safety
of crews and passengers. 79 The Germans attacked the British steamer
FALABA on March 28, 1915, with the loss of one American life, and
the LUSITANIA on May 7, 1915, with the loss of 128 American citi-
zens. 80 President Wilson protested the sinkings as indefensible acts in
violation of the rights of neutral shipping and contrary to international
law. 18' Diplomatic maneuvers eventually resulted in a German condi-
tional pledge not to sink passenger liners; however, the pledge did not
apply to merchant vessels and was not strong enough to prevent the
eventual United States entry into World War 1.182
These events in American diplomatic history, combined with cur-
176. Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
177. D. SMITH, supra note 172, at 164-65.
179. Id. at 290-95.
179. Id. at 282.
180. Id. at 283.
181. Id. at 284.
182. Id.
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rent disputes, reveal, contrary to the decision in Amerada Hess, that
the principle of international law underlying the claim in Amerada
Hess is more a political concept of convenience and military necessity
than a legal principle of international consensus. 183 Any assertion to the
contrary ignores the present and past instability of international mari-
time affairs."' The decision in Amerada Hess, therefore, suffers criti-
cally from a lack of legal and historical support for the claim that Ar-
gentina violated a "settled principle of international law." However, the
imprecision and inaccuracy of the decision has permitted the court to
discriminately subject Argentina to federal jurisdiction.
183. See Shift in Gulf Battle Fronts, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at Al, col. 1
(widening attacks on Persian Gulf shipping reflects desire for diplomatic advantage);
see also Commager Reagan Just Loves to Send Troops, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1988,
at A31, col. 1, which stated:
Early in the Civil War, the Confederate Government contracted with the Laird
shipbuilders of Liverpool to build ironclad rams-powerful warships-for delivery
in 1863. If they were allowed to slip out of Liverpool harbor, the cost to Union
warships and merchantmen would be catastrophic. The American Minister to
London, Charles F. Adams, challenged the legality of permitting the ships to es-
cape from British waters .... When it appeared that the rams would be allowed to
depart, Mr. Adams set a short note to the Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell:
"It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war."
Britain avoided war! .... We no longer take transgressions of traditional princi-
ples of international law so seriously - when they are our transgressions. And no
Administration has a more formidable record of successive violations of such prin-
ciples than Ronald Reagan's. Among these principles are nonintervention in the
affairs of other nations, adjudication of disputes, sparing civilians from haphazard
attack and deliberate destruction of the environment. The principles are enshrined
in treaties and thus form a part of the law of our land .... Mr. Reagan's record
embraces a series of military operations that, if directed against us, would clearly
and promptly be recognized as acts of war. And to its discredit, the Congress has
been all too compliant. . . . We are familiar enough with the Administration's
vengeful military actions in Lebanon, Libya and Grenada, along with harbor min-
ing in Nicaragua and support for the contras' nonstop war, and the dispatching of
troops to Honduras .... During the Civil War, the issue of illegal clearance of the
warship Alabama, built for the Confederacy, is no less illuminating than the crisis
settled amicably when Lord Russell prevented the Laird rams from leaving Liver-
pool. The Alabama did slip out of Liverpool and accounted for more than 60
Union ships until finally it was destroyed by the Kearsarge .... Later, we pressed
claims against Britain on this issue. The dispute was submitted to an international
tribunal and settled amicably. Britain acknowledged guilt and paid an indemnity
of $15.5 million .... It seems improbable that the Reagan Administration or its
successors will acknowledge comparable (but immensely larger) claims for com-
pensation to the victims of its passion for military solutions to political problems
and its own contempt for international law.
184. See Ratiner, The Law of the Sea; A Crossroads for American Foreign Pol-
icy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006 (1982).
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The only clear reference made by the court to a settled principle of
international law is to the act of piracy. Undisputedly, piracy has been
universally treated as an offense against the law of nations and would
support the exercise of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. The
Constitution links piracy and the law of nations by granting Congress
power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." 186 A superficial
analysis would, thus, seem to reveal that Argentina's attack on the
HERCULES would constitute a violation of an accepted principle of
international law and come within the purview of the tort violation of
international law set forth by the ATS. However, the true definition of
piracy is "robbery upon the sea." '186 It cannot be committed by a sover-
eign government: "[W]hen the acts in question are committed from
purely political motive, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of
piracy involving all the important consequences which follow upon the
commission of that act. 1817 Consequently, any reliance on the tort of
piracy to support federal jurisdiction in Amerada Hess over Argentina
or any other foreign sovereign is misplaced.
The claimants in Amerada Hess do not and cannot sufficiently
state a cause of action for a violation of a uniformly accepted principle
of international law. 188 Here, the claim lacks the prerequisite interna-
tional consensus supporting the exercise of federal jurisdiction pursuant
to the ATS. The right of neutral vessels at sea to be free from unpro-
voked attack has not been the subject of any international consensus
and, therefore, the prohibition is neither clear nor unambiguous.1 89
Therefore, the exercise of federal jurisdiction over Argentina is simply
an exercise in intellectual abstraction.1 90
185. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
186. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1819).
187. Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 814 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring).
188. The owner and charterer cited, with apparent success in the Second Circuit,
erudite authority to support the argument that the principle of freedom of navigation
had been universally accepted. See Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 40-46
(citing the Declaration of Paris of 1856; the International Convention Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague Convention of 1907); the
London Naval Conference of 1909; the 1928 Pan-American Convention Relating to
Maritime Neutrality; the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Na-
val Armament of 1930; the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; and the Law of
the Sea Convention of 1982).
189. But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Principles of international law are difficult to maintain in times of war and
the Falklands War was not an exception. See Made to Be Broken, THE ECONOMIST,
June 5, 1988, at 20-21:
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C. Inappropriate Interference with the Sovereignty of a Foreign
Government
The decision in Amerada Hess involves unique questions which
touch on sensitive matters of diplomacy and questions the legitimacy of
the conduct of a sovereign state. A court must abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over an action which calls into question the legitimacy and
legality of a government acting within its sovereign capacity.1"1 This is
not a case involving a clear departure from the presumption of sover-
eignty such as the torture of civilians, arbitrary imprisonment, political
assassination or other uniformly recognized violations of human rights
and international law. 192 The decision to conduct combat flight opera-
tions in the South Atlantic was an exercise of Argentina's sovereignty
and discretion to make use of its armed forces in order to pursue its
perceived national security interests.' 93 Argentina was free to exercise
prejudicial air operations during the Falklands War. Given this author-
ity, Argentina's conduct was clearly discretionary in character, and
The laws of war are practically impossible to enforce, and fighting men are usually
too busy with their work to look them up in the heat of battle. Almost 30 conven-
tions, protocols and resolutions are applicable. Here are some issues raised by the
Falklands conflict: . . . . Hospital ships must, as far as possible, be "situated in
such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety"
(Geneva Convention I, 1949). In bringing the UGANDA close to shore by night
to pick up wounded, the British may have breached that provision.... Prisoners of
war, except officers, may be employed as workers by their captors, but not on work
that is military in character or purpose, or of an unhealthy or dangerous nature:
"The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labour"
(Geneva Convention, III, 1949). Argentine prisoners have been ordered by their
captors to clear minefields near Goose Green. Others have been in-
jured-apparently together with British soldiers-in an explosion that may have
arisen when handling ammunition .... After a naval engagement, "parties to the
conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick" (Geneva Convention III, 1949). This does not
appear to have been done after the sinking of the GENERAL BELGRANO,
when the British might at least have offered to drop lifeboats by helicopter to
survivors in the water.... These, and no doubt other, matters yet to appear will
be the subject of anguished inquiry once the fighting ends ...
191. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77; see De Sanchez v. Banco Central De
Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1985) (when a foreign state's sovereign acts
are the basis of a suit the United States must refrain from exercising jurisdiction).
192. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
193. See, e.g., 3,000 G.l.'s Arrive At Honduras Base To Show Support, N.Y.
Times, March 18, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (more than 3,000 G.I.'s began arriving at a
Honduran air base as a show of support for the Honduran Government amid border
clashes between Honduran and Nicaraguan forces).
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should have remained immune from judicial review. 9 '
A sovereign state acts in the arena of international relations based
upon the assumption that the perceived liabilities consist of diplomatic
sanction, domestic protest, and possible reciprocal military operations,
not the risk of amenability to civil suit and penalty in a foreign juris-
diction. 195 A judgment rendering the conduct of a foreign government's
armed forces illegal seriously interferes with the basic assumptions
which underlie a government's structure of its foreign policy. In sum,
de novo judicial review of a foreign sovereign's policy judgments injects
a new and possibly dangerous dimension to foreign relations.
Adjudication of the claims in Amerada Hess requires a judicial
inquiry into the legitimacy of Argentina's strategy in conducting its
war operations during the Falklands War, and consequently, places the
court in the inappropriate position of judging the legality and integrity
of a sovereign's policy decisions. 96 Per se judgments simply cannot be
made with any semblance of accuracy in the arena of national sover-
eignty. Consequently, the decision in Amerada Hess will be viewed in
the region as reflecting a lack of respect for Argentine sovereignty and
will most likely be interpreted as an exercise of American imperial-
ism. 117 The decision of the Second Circuit in Amerada Hess will be
seen more as a whim of American power to meddle in the domestic
affairs of Argentina than a new commitment to international law in
Latin America. 98 Furthermore, the subjection of a foreign government
194. Asociacion De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190,
1198 (D.D.C. 1983), affd on other grounds, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 561, 576 (S.D. Tex.
1982) ("To deny immunity to a foreign state for the implementation of its domestic
economic policies would be to completely abrogate the doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity.").
195. Assumptions underlying foreign policy decisions have been outlined as involv-
ing the determinations: 1) defining a concept of national security; 2) defining a national
purpose; and 3) assessing the available resources. Kissinger, The Great Foreign Policy
Divide, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1987, at A23, col. 2. See also Weinberg, The Use of
Force and the National Will, Bait. Sun, Dec. 3, 1984, at 10A, col. 1 (delineating six
points to be weighed before committing combat forces).
196. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
197. Compare Honduran Unrest Persists In Wake of Embassy Riot, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6 and Stark Anti-Americanism in Honduras, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 9, 1988, at A6, col. I (discussing student riots that erupted after extradition of
Honduran drug trafficker to the United States in violation of Honduran law).
198. In discussing the Latin American resentment of Reagan Administration's
campaign to topple Panama's military regime, the reporter commented that:
These are, of course, well-practiced reactions. Since President James Knox Polk's
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to the jurisdiction of a United States court sets a dangerous precedent
for reciprocal judicial review of the legitimacy of United States policy
decisions in a foreign or federal court.199
On April 15, 1988, The Baltimore Sun reported that a lawsuit had
been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia seeking damages for claims arising out of the April 15, 1986,
United States retaliatory air strike on Libya. 00 The action asserted
that the bombing resulted in the deaths of civilians and therefore vio-
lated United States laws and treaties and international law.2 0' The arti-
cle reported that the lawsuit was seeking damages for forty civilians
troops first seized half of Mexico's territory in 1847, a history regularly punc-
tuated by military and political interventions has forced Latin America to learn to
live with the reality of American power. In fact, even in the annals of the Reagan
Administration which invaded Grenada in 1983 and still dreams of toppling Nica-
ragua's Sandinista Government, the latest Panamanian episode is so far no more
than a footnote.
Id. Unfortunately, the decision in Amerada Hess may be viewed in a similar vein.
Additionally, the reporter explained the essence of the resentment of the Reagan Ad-
ministration's Latin American policy:
The essence of this response is, of course, self-preservation. By legitimizing the
idea that unsavory leaders should be undermined by outside forces, all govern-
ments would open themselves up to the risk of destabilization. And while the
United States has traditionally placed its own national security interest above
strict adherence to international law, Latin American governments view juridical
principles as their only shields .... For our countries that are weak and have no
large armies or atomic bombs, it has to cause fear when the United States converts
itself into the policeman of the continent and decides which countries are or are
not democratic and which deserve economic sanctions and boycotts," said Vene-
zuela's former President, Carlos Andres Perez, in an interview with a Mexican
daily....
Id. It is difficult to gauge whether the decision in Amerada Hess will invoke similar
responses. The point which must be emphasized is that it is with the discretion of the
Executive and Congress to assume the risks of acting in the international arena.
199. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and
86-7603), which claims:
To the extent that a contrary result would create jurisdiction where none was in-
tended by the FSIA, it exposes the United States to similar jurisdiction abroad.
The theory of jurisdiction advanced by appellant could expose the United States to
jurisdiction abroad for virtually any act said to be inconsistent with international
law, as construed by any country in which the United States might be found. The
United States does not believe Congress intended to establish jurisdiction over
cases such as this, and would vigorously oppose the assertion of such jurisdiction
against the United States abroad.
200. See Libyan Bombing Lawsuit Seeks Personal Money Damages from Rea-
gan, Thatcher, Bait. Sun, Apr. 15, 1988, at 9A, col. 1.
201. Id.
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injured and fifteen others who were killed in the air strike. Many of the
fifty civilians were Libyan nationals, but others were Egyptians,
Greeks, Lebanese and Yugoslavians. Among those named as defend-
ants were President Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, former Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, other mil-
itary officials, and the pilots who flew the Air Force and Navy planes.
Whether an act of the United States or a foreign country, the inquiries
presented by the Libyan suit and by the Amerada Hess decision are
precisely the type of determination from which a court should abstain
from unilaterally interpreting a grant of federal jurisdiction. 202 If
Amerada Hess is allowed to stand, there would be no basis for holding
that a review of the legitimacy of the Libyan air operation is non-justi-
ciable. The United States would, thus, be subject to claims arising from
its conduct of foreign policy. Any argument to the contrary would be
effete in light of the rule of decision established in Amerada Hess.
D. Jurisdictional Inconsistency
The formal adoption of the view stated in the Second Circuit's
opinion in Amerada Hess would grant aliens greater access to the juris-
diction of the federal courts for actions against foreign governments
than is granted to United States citizens. The exclusive source author-
izing an American citizen to sue a foreign government in a United
States court is the FSIA. Under the FSIA, a United States vessel
owner or charterer would not be permitted to maintain the very same
action which the Second Circuit has now allowed an alien to assert.
Clearly, the intent of the ATS and the FSIA was not to accord aliens a
202. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 302 (D. Cal. 1986); Northrop
Corporation v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1048 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). See also Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80
(S.D. Cal. 1986), which opined:
[l]t appears that plaintiffs' theory of liability is that Marcos in his capacity as
President of the Philippines engaged in a systematic policy of suppressing rights of
free speech in the Philippines. This theory of recovery requires precisely the type
of inquiry in which the federal courts have refused to engage under the Act of
State doctrine. It is beyond the capacity of the federal courts to subject the official
acts or policies of the head of a foreign state to traditional standards of judicial
review.
Accord West v. Multibanco Cornermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987) (act of
state doctrine which prohibits courts from reaching merits of issue in order to avoid
embarrassment of foreign governments in politically sensitive matters and desire to
avoid interference with conduct of United States foreign policy precluded consideration
of alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance of Mexican officials charged with enforcing their
country's banking laws).
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privilege not granted to United States citizens. Thus, at the very least,
the Second Circuit's decision would permit an inequitable result which
would be contrary to the stated purpose of the FSIA to codify a uni-
form standard governing the amenability of foreign governments to suit
in the United States.203
There is an additional policy basis for denying jurisdiction. The
HERCULES was a Liberian flag vessel of convenience. The owner and
charterer were both Liberian corporations which consciously chose to
avoid the tax and regulatory consequences of incorporating in the
United States and the higher operational costs of flagging the HER-
CULES under United States law.20' American flag vessels sustain a
reciprocal financial burden but receive certain benefits and protections
which are appendages to flying the United States flag.205 More specifi-
cally, one of the benefits a United States flag vessel has at its disposal
203. The families of the sailors on the STARK would certainly not possess a
cause of action against Iraq. There have been other actions brought by Americans
which have been dismissed but would have been allowed to stand if brought by an
alien. See Perez v. The Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sovereign immunity
barred action against Bahamas for tort arising from incident in which plaintiffs minor
son was injured when Bahamian government gunboats fired on plaintiffs fishing ves-
sel); Legerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1985) (Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act precluded former hostage's action in tort for alleged personal injuries
and deprivation of civil rights arising out of seizure by Iran of the United States Em-
bassy in Iran). In Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313 (D.D.C. 1985),
the court dismissed a wrongful claim brought by American citizens against El Salvador
arising out of the death of an American citizen in El Salvador. The courts held that it
was vested with jurisdiction only if the tort as well as the injury occurred in the United
States. The court remarked that to hold otherwise would result in:
Every alleged governmental tort occurring in any foreign country would be subject
to review in the courts of the United States at the request of any member of the
family of the victim who claimed to have suffered emotional distress here as a
consequence of the foreign act. Such international judicial interference would be
entirely unprecedented, and a court would not be justified in engaging in it unless
congressional intent to grant jurisdiction therefor were manifestly plain. That, as
indicated, is not true here. The claim against the government of El Salvador will
accordingly be dismissed.
Id. at 1316.
204. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 30-40 (1987) (Coast Guard regulations for tank vessels);
46 C.F.R. §§ 90-106 (1987) (Coast Guard regulations for cargo vessels). See also
Spreading the Gulf Umbrella, Wash. Post, May 3, 1988, at A26, col. 1 (in discussing
Reagan Administration's decision to broaden naval protection in the Persian Gulf the
author noted that, "[i]t takes some getting used to that American-owned ships that fled
to a foreign flag to avoid American maritime union wages can now slip in under the
wing of the U.S. Navy.").
205. See Kuwait to Switch tankers to U.S. Flags for Protection, Bait. Sun, May
13, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
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is the full brunt of the diplomatic, economic, and military power of the
United States government.' 6 One of the burdens assumed by a Libe-
rian flag vessel is the absence of recourse opportunities which can be
provided by a defense or foreign ministry 07 and the more immediate
coercion which a country sustaining a blue water navy can extend in
response to attack on one of its merchant vessels in international wa-
ters.2 0 8 As a result, denying United Carriers, Hess, and similarly situ-
ated claimants' access to United States courts would not create any
undue hardship, or assert any latent risk or notion of inequity. The
vessel owner and charterer chose to forego the financial burden of a
prominent national flag in order to receive the corresponding commer-
cial benefit of a flag of convenience. They must now accept the corre-
sponding burden of limited recourse opportunities afforded by this com-
mercial convenience.2
9
206. See U.S. Strikes 2 Iranian Oil Rigs, Hits 6 Navy Vessels In Battles Over
Mining Sea Lanes in Gulf, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at Al. col. 4; U.S.-Flag Tanker
Struck By Missile in Kuwaiti Waters, N.Y. Times, Oct. r7, i9l7, at Al, col. 1. (Ira-
nian Silkworm missile attack on U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker SEA ISLE CITY eventu-
ally prompted the United States to shell Iranian offshore oil drilling platform); U.S.
Weighs Response To Ship Attack in Gulf, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1987, at A5, col. 6.
But see U.S.-Run Tanker Hit By Iranians in Gulf,- Tehran Seen Defying Naval Retali-
ation, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1987, at A16, col. 3 (Iranian speedboat attack with rocket
propelled grenades on U.S.-operated Panamanian tanker - not retaliation contemplated;
Navy's rules of engagement limit the task force to defending U.S.-flagged vessels in
Persian Gulf, not U.S.-managed vessels flying foreign flags).
207. In fact on June 12, 1982, the Government of Liberia, in notes directed to
both the British and Argentine Governments, requested clarification of the attacks on
HERCULES. On July 5, 1982, the United Kingdom replied, denying any involvement
in the attack and stating that British Military Intelligence had confirmed that the at-
tacking aircraft were from Argentina. No response was ever received from the Argen-
tine Government. See Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 8.
208. The owner and charterer have conceded this point in their brief before the
Second Circuit:
As this Court is no doubt aware, contemporary cases where U.S. flag vessels have
been illegally taken on the high seas by foreign sovereigns are rare. In fact, the
last case was the S.S. MAYAGUEZ, Dig. of U.S. Prac. in Int'l L. (1975) at 777-
886. In that case, the American owner received restitution of his ship and cargo by
the intervention of U.S. frigates and marines. Obviously, the Republic of Liberia
does not have the military means to effect restitution of her ships illegally seized or
destroyed by other sovereigns. Instead, the Republic of Liberia must depend upon
international law as practiced by this country and other countries which respect
and honor their obligations for events occurring on the high seas.
Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 31 (citations omitted).
209. It has been argued that the interest of the United States in the attack may
have been of a sufficient nature to warrant the investment of American diplomatic and
military prestige. See Brief of Amicus Seamen's Church Institute at 8-9, Amerada
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E. Judicial Activism
The Second Circuit has inappropriately substituted its judgment
for the clear intent of Congress to establish the line of departure by
defining the jurisdictional limits of the courts in matters affecting the
diplomatic relations of the United States. The Second Circuit's recog-
nition that the FSIA is the "sole source" from which a foreign sover-
eign may obtain immunity and the only basis upon which a court can
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign"" directly conflicts with
its pronouncement that Congress intended to provide federal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign government under the ATS. The difficulty in recon-
ciling this conflicting analysis is reflected in the untenable result which
affords aliens greater access to the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
Hess, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603), which states:
Compounding the problem of U.S. reliance on foreign imports is the fact that
today, unlike the situation of even 10 or 15 years ago, the vast majority of
merchant ships are ships which, wherever beneficial ownership may lie, are flying
the flags of foreign nations and not that of the United States. Thus, from these
figures it can be seen that the United States not only has an interest in protecting
the right of its own ships to travel freely, as neutral ships through combat zones,
but also to protect this right as applied to neutral ships of other nations who bring
to our shores the goods and materials that we need .... Were the United States,
and/or other nations of the world to not protect this right of unmolested passage
for neutral merchant ships through war zones, not only the economy of the United
States, but that of much of the rest of the world would come to a grinding halt.
The owner and charterer also make the point that:
The importance of Liberian flag ships to U.S. economic survival cannot be overes-
timated. In the era in which the Alien Tort Statute was enacted, the United States
had a large American flag merchant fleet which transported over 80 percent of the
country's foreign commerce .... Of U.S. ocean borne foreign trade in 1980, only
3.7 percent was carried on U.S. flag ships. In the case of tankers like HERCU-
LES, the figure was 2.2 percent. In contrast, the dependence of the United States
on seaborne imports has steadily increased. . . . In the case of national needs for
strategic metals and minerals, in most cases, imports account for between 80 and
100 percent of these requirements. U.S. companies have, for economic reasons,
developed foreign flag fleets, the largest being those sailing under the flag of Libe-
ria. These stark facts establish the economic reliance of the United States on hav-
ing its seaborne commerce carried by neutral foreign flag ships such as those of
Liberia and give modern meaning to the Colonial slogan, "Free goods on free
ships."
Joint Brief for Appellants, supra note 78, at 47. If true, United States diplomatic and
military prestige, as it was in the Mayaguez incident, should have been applied. See
U.S. Will Increase Its Gulf Defense of Merchant Ships, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1988, at
Al, col. 1; and Reagan Orders Broader Protection of Commercial Shipping in Gulf,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1988, at A4, col. 1 (reporting on United States decision to com-
mit to defend neutral commercial shipping in Persian Gulf against Iranian attack).
210. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 429.
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assert actions against foreign sovereigns than is afforded United States
citizens.
Pursuant to its authority over foreign commerce and foreign rela-
tions, Congress has the undisputed power to define whether, and under
what circumstances, foreign nations shall be amenable to suit in the
United States.2" Furthermore, only Congress is authorized to define
offenses against the law of nations.21 2 Pursuant to this authority, Con-
gress enacted the FSIA to comprehensively regulate the amenability of
foreign governments to suit in the United States. The FSIA initially
grants a presumption of immunity to foreign states and their instru-
mentalities and then carves out certain classes of actions which are ex-
ceptions ,to this grant of immunity.213 Unless one of the statutory ex-
ceptions applies, the federal courts lack both subject-matter2 14 and
personal jurisdiction.21 These specific and unambiguous guidelines gov-
ern the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.
The FSIA is the exclusive source of jurisdiction over foreign sover-
eigns, and a public act of the foreign state is not an act within the
exception to immunity. 216 The excepthns to immunity are plenary in
scope and definitive in character.2"7 The FSIA was intended to compre-
hensively preempt all actions against foreign governments beyond the
exceptions set forth in the statute including a claim based upon a viola-
211. U.S. CONST. art. I.
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
213. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1982).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982).
216. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D.D.C. 1980):
Any notion that the Congress wished the courts to go outside the scheme promul-
gated by legislative action to determine the extent to which the defense of sover-
eign immunity could be invoked is foreclosed by the committee reports that not
only state that "[t]his bill ... sets forth the sole and exclusive standard to be used
in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Fed-
eral and State courts in the United States," "that the plaintiff's claim relates to a
public act of the foreign state-that is, an act not within the exceptions in section
1605-1607," H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, supra at 17 (emphasis supplied). Thus, it is
apparent that the terms of section 1605(a)(5) set the sole standard under which
any claim of sovereign immunity must be examined.
217. The majority view can be accurately characterized as interpreting the FSIA
as the exclusive source of jurisdiction over foreign states. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983); O'Connell Machinery Co. v.
M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1086
(1984); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
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tion of international law.21 The FSIA does not set forth a residual
clause defining any parameter to broaden the jurisdictional grant over a
foreign government or refer to collateral statutes which broaden the
jurisdiction over a foreign state, but only states its exclusivity. It is
therefore unlikely that Congress intended the FSIA to be only one of
several avenues for asserting a claim against a foreign government.2 19
The comprehensive scheme established by the FSIA must be
viewed as the exclusive means by which foreign governments may be
sued by either an American citizen or alien in United States courts.220
Accordingly, if a court determines that none of the exceptions set forth
within the FSIA applies, the plaintiff, whether alien or United States
citizen, will be barred from asserting the claim in any court in the
United States against a foreign sovereign irrespective of the nature and
characterization of the underlying. action. The plain language of the
FSIA establishes a patent legislative intent to set forth the exclusive
framework within which the courts of the United States are to deter-
mine the amenability of a foreign government to the jurisdiction of a
United States court. Any review of the decision in Amerada Hess
should, thus, seize upon the opportunity to firmly establish this jurisdic-
tional principle.
The ATS does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns. It is an obscure statute which was enacted to
avoid inflaming the diplomatic relations of the United States in the
1790's. A court may be permitted to look beyond the limited actions
originally contemplated, as they related to ambassadors and consular
officers, to fashion a more comprehensive or "modern" statutory right.
However, the statute should not be read to encompass tort actions
against a foreign government which is beyond the scope of the FSIA.22'1
218. See Note, Torts In Violation of International Law, 1 LMCLQ 10 (1988)
("in a case such as Amerada Hess, international law does not at present warrant an
exception to sovereign immunity. .. ").
219. In fact service on Argentina was made in accordance with the FSIA. See
Brief for Appellee at 3 and most likely, any collection of a judgment against Argentina
would be pursuant to the FSIA. See Leteiler v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1984).
220. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th
Cir. 1985); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; Amerada Hess, 638 F.2d at 74; Ledgerwood v.
State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.D.C. 1985) (congress has vested exclusive
jurisdiction over suits against foreign state defendants in the FSIA).
221. See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 645 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1486) (viola-
tion of First Amendment right of free speech does not rise to level of universally recog-
nized right and does not constitute violation of "law of nations," for purpose of jurisdic-
tion under ATS); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976) (taking of
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To include actions against foreign governments would be so beyond the
initial purpose as to contradict the intent of the ATS and to substan-
tially dilute the FSIA.222
In attempting to establish novel jurisdictional principles against
foreign governments, it would be imprudent to divorce the enabling
analysis from the original intention of the ATS. Although the statute
should evolve to consider modern assumptions, in order to avoid any
wholesale substitution of the legislative intent, a broader or more mod-
ern reading must continue to consider the statute's original purpose of
which was to avoid inflaming diplomatic relations.223 To go beyond this
juncture would be to ignore the historical reference. The expansion of
the ATS as detailed in Amerada Hess ignores the statute's historical
context and goes beyond any permissible sphere of interpretative li-
cense so as to refract congressional intent, not reflect it.
The majority opinion in Amerada Hess is largely pedestrian and
at best schematic. In a tangible sense, the analysis in Amerada Hess is
inferior to Filartiga. Filartiga expanded the extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion of a federal court over a wrongful death action against a former
foreign official for a violation of the laws of Paraguay and international
law. The decision in Amerada Hess fails to appreciate the delicate and
precise limitations of the Filartiga doctrine to suits against former for-
eign officials in their individual capacity and not foreign governments
in their sovereign capacity. The Amerada Hess construction of the
ATS permitting a property damage claim against a foreign sovereign is
too sweeping and opens a potential Pandora's box of side issues. What
constitutes a "tort" within the purview of the ATS will be handled dif-
ferently depending on the parochial orientation of the various district
courts towards the particular foreign government. Thus, federal juris-
diction over foreign governments will be unpredictable and viewed as
arbitrary because the jurisdictional allegation will most likely vary be-
tween the federal circuits.22 4 The adoption of the reasoning in Amerada
Jewish German citizen's property by Nazis not a violation of international law), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
(acts of theft not violations of international law and not triable here under ATS
statute).
222. See Sanchez-Espunoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ATS
intended to cover only private nongovernmental acts that are contrary to treaty or in-
ternational law the most prominent examples being piracy and assaults upon
ambassadors).
223. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring).
224. Cf., Federal Sentences in Limbo as Guidelines Challenged, Wash. Post,
March 2, 1988, at A19, col. I (discussing inconsistency created by lack of uniformity
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Hess will consequently create the same absence of uniformity in bring-
ing actions against foreign sovereigns which compelled the initial enact-
ment of the FSIA. Accordingly, the rejection of the construction of
federal jurisdiction established in Amerada Hess is supported by politi-
cal, historical, and legal considerations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Amerada Hess conveniently avoids the historical
context in which the FSIA and the ATS were enacted and neglects a
clinical analysis of the undermining nature of precedent. This is not a
case of simple statutory misinterpretation which should be left alone.
The precedent established by the ruling will have broad consequences
beyond a property damage claim within the maritime context. The de-
cision will result in the subjection of the policy judgments of foreign
sovereigns to determinations of legality in United States courts with
inevitable consequences for the tenor of American diplomatic relations.
Foreign affairs involve a complex understanding of the economic,
historical, and political considerations which are beyond the limited re-
sources of a federal district court judge assisted by law clerks and a
chambers library restricted to volumes of legal precedent. While the
law may at times accommodate a certain amount of contradiction and
duality, such lack of clarity is impermissible in the area of foreign af-
fairs. Because the conduct of foreign policy consists of the relationship
between governments and translates into a direct impact on the human
condition, the requisite analysis affecting the tone of these relationships
must be the product of a sophisticated and experienced foreign policy
apparatus. It is inappropriate, therefore, for a federal court to influence
both the value and validity of the direction of American foreign policy.
It is equally inappropriate for a court to consider the legitimacy and
legality of a foreign government's sovereign acts.
Congress intended to extend the FSIA to the full extent afforded
by the existing political consensus. It was extremely palatable to extend
federal jurisdiction to sovereign acts which so closely resemble that of
any other commercial entity and to torts committed by a foreign sover-
eign in the United States. The gap in the regime established by the
FSIA concerns the tortious conduct committed by sovereigns outside
the United States. Compensation for these offenses can be obtained by
one of three ways: (1) possible unilateral recognition by a foreign sov-
ereign of its obligation to compensate the victims of its conduct;22 5 (2)
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
225. See U.S. Compensation Will Be Provided in Airbus Downing, N.Y. Times,
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decisions of international courts of justice or tribunals;226 or (3) diplo-
matic pressure exerted on the sovereign to provide compensation. 227 If a
foreign sovereign's public acts result in personal injury or property
damage, the redress outlined above would provide an available recourse
which may, in some circumstances, afford a more acceptable adminis-
tration of justice and compensation than is afforded by civil litigation in
a federal district court.
The FSIA is the exclusive means of asserting a claim against a
foreign government.228 The ATS does not provide independent jurisdic-
tion over claims against foreign governments for violations of interna-
tional law. It may provide jurisdiction over claims of aliens for torts
uniformly accepted as violations of international law where they are
committed: (1) in the United States (concurrently with the FSIA tort
exception); or (2) outside the United States by foreign officials in their
July 12, 1988, Al, col. 6 (United States will pay compensation to the families of the
290 passengers killed when a Iranian jetliner was shot down by an American warship
in the Persian Gulf).
226. See O.A.S Tribunal Finds Honduras Guilty in Political Killing, A First,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1988, Al, col. 2 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled
that the Honduran government is guilty in the disappearance of a Honduran citizen in
1981 and the court ordered Honduras to pay damages to the victim's relative); Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States).
International Court of Justice, slip. op. at 3-6, (June 27, 1986) holding that:
[B]y laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicara-
gua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted,
against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations, under customary
international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its
affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime com-
merce .... [TIhe United States of America . . . by declaring a general embargo
on trade with Nicaragua on I May 1985 has committed acts calculated to deprive
of its object and purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956 .... [The] United
States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to [above] ...
and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has
acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January
1956 .... [T]he United States of America is under an obligation to make repara-
tion to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the
breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated above ....
227. See U.S. Bills Chile in Killing of Letelier, N.Y. Times, October 13, 1988,
Al, col. 1 (reporting that the Reagan Administration has demanded $12 million in
compensation from Chile for the killing of Chilean exile in Washington, D.C. in 1976).
229. LEGISLATIVE HIS-tORV, supra note 8, at 6604 ("The purpose of the [Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act] is to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit
against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States and to provide
when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity.").
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
individual capacity, acting beyond their scope of authority or contrary
to the laws of their own nation. Although the decision is consistent with
the current proclivity to limit immunity,229 when a case presents broad
and novel questions involving foreign sovereign immunity and the in-
terfacing of the FSIA and the ATS, the proper deliberative body to
resolve the question is the Congress which can draw upon the experi-
ence of the Executive through the Congressional committee hearing
process.
The United States federal courts must refrain from the raw exer-
cise of political power in the area of foreign affairs. If the Congress
should decide that torts committed by foreign governments outside of
the United States are proper subjects for judicial inquiry, Congress is
free to accurately and precisely define the guidelines by which such
judicial inquiries should proceed by enacting the proper jurisdictional
statutes. If such guidelines are set forth along the lines of the Second
Circuit's decision in Amerada Hess, Congress, and not the courts, will
consciously assume the corresponding diplomatic risk of a federal
court's adjudication of the legality and culpability of foreign sovereign
conduct.
The impact of the decision is difficult to gauge. There remains the
question of whether: (1) the violation of international law must be mar-
itime in nature23 0 and (2) regardless of whether there must be a mari-
time nexus, must the claim have a substantive connection with United
States commerce? In light of the attacks in the Persian Gulf, will a
foreign vessel owner or charterer, whose vessel is attacked by land-
based rockets or strafed by speed boats and damaged, be granted ac-
cess to a federal district court to bring an action against Iran or Iraq
pursuant to the ATS? 231 Will a foreign seaman injured by those at-
tacks be able to present an action in the federal courts against those
Persian Gulf nations? 23 2 In a much wider context, will claims against
229. See Appeals Court Restricts Immunity For Congress on Defamation, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at A32, col. 1 (discussing recent decision rejecting extension of
official immunity to members of Congress under certain circumstances).
230. Maritime tort jurisdiction extends to all incidents that: (1) occur on naviga-
ble waters (situs) and (2) bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity" (status). See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 864 (1986).
231. See Iranian Gunboats Raid Two Tankers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at A3,
col. 1; Iranian Frigate Attacks Greek Tanker in Gulf, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1987, at
A38, col. 1; 4 Tankers Are Reported Attacked By Iranian Speed Boats in the Gulf,
N.Y. Times, Nov 17, 1987, at A12, col. 4.
232. See 54 Feared Dead on 2 Oil Tankers In Iraqi Attack on Iran Terminal,
N.Y. Times, March 22, 1988, at Al, col 3. The New York Times reported that more
19881
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South Africa for its repression... or Palestinian claims against Israel
for deaths, injuries and damage recently inflicted by the Israeli Army
in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza territory 34 be cognizable in a
federal court? " 5 The Second Circuit, through its decision in Amerada
Hess has answered these questions in the affirmative. For now it is the
responsibility of the Supreme Court to decide if the extent of federal
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns for violations of international law
will be confined to the parameters of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.
than 50 seamen from two Norwegian managed supertankers reported missing and pre-
sumed dead and detailed that:
More than 200 seamen have been killed in about 480 attacks by both sides since
the "tanker war" started in 1984. Statistics kept by Lloyd's of London say twice
as many ships were hit in the first two and a half months of this year as in the
same period in 1987, the most intense year in the shipping war .... The worst
known previous gulf death toll among merchant seamen was recorded last Decem-
ber, when 21 crewmen on the Norwegian-managed tanker SUSANGIRD,
chartered by Iran, were killed in an Iraqi attack .... Iraq launched the tanker war
in an effort to sever Iran's main source of revenues. Iran has responded by striking
at neutral vessels on their way to gulf nations including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
which Teheran holds to be allies of Baghdad....
Id. (capitalization supplied).
233. See Foe of Apartheid Is Shot Dead in Paris, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1988,
at A3, col. 3. (Paris representative of African National Congress allegedly killed by
South African secret police); South Africa Bans Most Anti-Apartheid Activities, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (South Africa bans activities of seventeen leading
anti-apartheid organizations from political action).
234. See Israel Says Arabs Under Detention Now Number 3,000, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 4 (reporting that Israel was detaining 3,000 Palestinians in
connection with the protests in the occupied territories); 6 Arabs Are Slain By Israeli
Troops, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 6 (six Palestinians were shot to death by
Israeli soldiers in Israeli-occupied West Bank); Army Says Israeli Girl Was Killed by
Her Guard, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at Al. col. 2, (Israeli Army destroys 14 houses
of those accused of participating in death of Israeli girl); 8 Arabs Deported To South
Lebanon By Israeli Order, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1988, at Al, col. 2 (Israel expels eight
Palestinians into southern Lebanon and ordered the deportation of 12 others); U.S.
Assails P.L.O. Aide's Killing as 'Act of Political Assassination, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1988, at Al, col. 5.
235. See Foreign Sovereigns' Right to Sue Here Expanded, Nat. Law J., Sept.
28, 1987, at 33. ("Specialist in international law said the ruling [Amerada Hess] is
likely to help human rights groups gain jurisdiction in U.S. courts for cases involving
foreign victims, foreign nations and extraterritorial events. They predict some of the
owners of the 281 merchant shops attacked between 1984 and last July by Iran and
Iraq in the Persian Gulf also may find the ruling useful.").
